Transcript: Webinar – Erdogan’s Turkey: NATO Host or Hazard?
Click here to watch the webinar.
PANELISTS
Svante Cornell
JINSA Scholar; Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute
Alan Makovsky
Member, JINSA Benjamin Gettler Project for East Med Security; Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
The discussion was moderated by JINSA Vice President for Policy Blaise Misztal.
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TRANSCRIPT
Transcript has been lightly edited for flow and clarity.
Blaise Misztal
Good afternoon and thank you for joining another JINSA webinar. I’m JINSA’s Vice President for Policy, Blaise Misztal.
I’m here with a great panel to discuss what we saw happen this week at the Ankara NATO summit that President Trump attended. I think the headline coming out of the summit was President Trump’s promise to lift sanctions on Turkey and hint that he’d be willing to sell them the F-35. [This is] something that I think will be even more in the news now that we’re hearing reports that Turkey is preparing to sell its S-400 Russian air defense system, which had been at least one of the obstacles to the F-35 sale. They might finally be getting rid of the S-400 and selling it to a Gulf country—potentially the U.A.E., or Qatar has also been mentioned in some reports. But I also want to discuss the NATO summit itself and Turkey’s role in that alliance, which hasn’t always been an easy one.
To do that, I’m delighted to be joined by two of the greatest Turkey experts on either side of the Atlantic: Alan Makovsky, a fellow at the Center for American Progress and a member of JINSA’s Benjamin Gettler project on the Eastern Mediterranean, and JINSA’s scholar and director of the Central Asia Caucus Institute, Svante Cornell. Thank you both for being with us. Ambassador Eric Edelman was also supposed to join us, but unfortunately, he won’t be able to make it. But I know both of you have more than enough knowledge here to fill the next hour.
Maybe I could start with you, to tell us a little bit about the history of Turkey’s relations with NATO, at least over the last 15 years or so under the reign of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Svante Cornell
Well, thank you, Blaise, and it’s a delight to be with you and with Alan, as always. I’m sure Alan would know better this recent history, but perhaps Alan, you’ll correct me if I’m wrong. I think that in general we can say that on the one hand, Turkey has a foreign policy that is very, should we say, independent and transactional. It doesn’t really get into, or at least follow a consensus, or put following a consensus in NATO at the center of its concerns. On the other hand, NATO is the only formal alliance that Turkey is part of, with the possible exception of the bilateral one with Azerbaijan. This means that when push comes to shove and when Turkey feels insecure about one thing or another, the feeling that NATO is important gets stronger. When Turkey feels more secure and doesn’t feel any threats, they tend to forget a bit about the importance of NATO for Turkey.
That said, I think what we’ve seen over the past 15 years or so is, as always—or I shouldn’t say as always, because during the Cold War the NATO commitment by Turkey was fairly strong because there was consistently the threat to the Soviet Union. But in the past 15 years, there’s been up and down with many different iterations of Turkey shifting its momentary thinking about where NATO fits in its general security. We’ve had situations where Turkey was drifting more into the Middle East with a more Islamist foreign policy. That was in many ways not compatible with many of NATO’s goals. We’ve obviously had times when Turkey has felt more the importance of NATO whenever it’s been threatened by Russia, as it was in 2015, for example; we see that Turkey was more interested in NATO. There have always also been domestic considerations, especially with the 2016 coup that was largely believed to be orchestrated by the Gulen movement, which led to many of the, on paper, most pro-NATO American-linked officers in the Turkish military being purged, with a more nationalist group of officers taking precedence for a while, [who] were more critical of NATO.
At the same time, I think we have to acknowledge that the key thing for Turkey has always been, not NATO as a multilateral alliance, but a bilateral military and security relationship with the United States. And as that relationship goes, Turkey’s commitment to NATO goes. So right now, where we have a very strong personal relationship between Presidents Trump and Erdogan, as you alluded to, Blaise, you will see that many of the controversies are kept under the carpet. [They] are not brought to the forefront, even though they might be simmering under the surface. Whereas, if somebody else might be president, the situation might be different. So, I’ll stop here for now, and I hope Alan can add something that I missed.
Blaise Misztal
Yeah, Alan, feel free to chime in, but I also wanted to ask you about, sort of, what were the optics heading into this summit of NATO convening in Ankara, and what were sort of the expectations maybe heading into the summit?
Alan Makovsky
Well, first of all, let me just say how great it is to be on a panel with you, Blaise and with Svante, and to address your wonderful audience. Okay, this summit was supposed to be very important. We’re describing it as NATO 3.0, sort of the first major summit of a new era for NATO, where Europeans take more responsibility for their own defense, while the United States diminishes its role, and Turkey wants to be at the center of this. Turkey has a growing defense industrial sector. It’s, I believe, last year was the 11th leading exporter of military goods, and it’s climbing. And Turkey wants to be one of the primary centers for European production, physically, of equipment and arms and, strategically, for security overall, and for Turkey hosting this summit was highly symbolic.
It was also a great prestige. It was supposed to be, and I suppose in this regard, it was a great prestige builder for Erdogan. President Trump said, basically, the only reason he was attending was that it was an Erdogan summit. His good friend Erdogan was hosting it, and that was the reason for his attendance. And of course, just for Turkey under any circumstances, hosting such a major event, such a major security event, would be a prestige builder, but for such an important NATO summit, I think it’s particularly so. Maybe by the way, I thought, Svante, you gave a fantastic overview of Turkey and NATO.
I just maybe wanted to add one thought. It has been a source of discord, as you mentioned, between Turkey and its other NATO allies. It was for many years Turkey’s relationship with Russia. I think it’s been a great success for Turkey that it has basically won its alliances’ acceptance of the fact that it is pursuing strategic autonomy. I think this process really started with the Ukraine war, when initially the Allies were very upset that Turkey was sitting on the fence, but then Turkey was able to negotiate a grain export deal between Ukraine and Russia. At least Turkey got credit for negotiating it. The UN was also part of the negotiating team. And ever since then, it seems to me a lot of the criticism of Turkey’s relations with Russia has diminished on the part of the allies. It certainly doesn’t seem to be a problem at all for President Trump, and even under President Biden, his team said, ‘Well, Turkey has an independent foreign policy, but we can cooperate on many issues.’
So, Turkey has managed to pursue this relationship with Russia without upsetting ties with NATO, and also, for all its human rights problems, the alliance is looking the other way these days.
Blaise Misztal
Yeah, I have to say I was surprised that neither of you mentioned, particularly Svante, beaming into us as you are from Sweden, Turkey’s role in delaying, for almost two years, Sweden’s accession into NATO following the war in Ukraine. And then, Alan, to your point, among the NATO members, Turkey is the only one that did not adopt sanctions against Russia following the Ukraine invasion. In fact, it became an important source for Russian money trying to get out and Russian exports trying to get out into the world. But as you said, it seems like that is now water under the bridge, or even something that is seen as maybe a strategic advantage that Ankara has these relations with Moscow.
Alan Makovsky
Yes, yeah, no, I think that’s right. Turkey, of course, always maintained, as it was criticized at the beginning of the war, for not applying Russia sanctions, that it’s important to have somebody who can talk to both sides. And I think they, this is looking at it historically, but they sort of won their spurs in the eyes of many people when they negotiated that grain deal so long ago in 2022. And over time, first the Biden administration, and then it seems the Europeans, don’t raise that issue very much. As you say, it’s seen even as an advantage that Turkey can talk to all sides. It’s certainly seen that way by the current U.S. administration, which, after all, has its own unique relationship with Russia—which is, at a minimum, we could say less hostile than Biden’s relationship with Russia.
Svante Cornell
Yeah. So, I agree fully with what you’re saying, Alan. I think you could add another dimension to it, which is that while Turkey did maintain its relationship with Russia and did not join the sanctions, it also won credibility and was able to counter accusations of being too close to the Russians by its very military support for Ukraine as well, and in other ways. Not least because of, by then, high-standard Bayraktar missiles—I suppose today the Ukrainians are mostly using stuff that they build themselves, which are apparently better than [what] anybody else builds – but not only that they supplied these UAVs to Ukraine, but also had them built under contract in Ukraine. I think [this] complicated the picture that some people saw of a Turkey that was just very, very close to the Russians.
And although that might not be in the newspapers, there is also the fact that it’s a very strange relationship, the one between Turkey and Russia. On the one hand, okay, in a way similar to the way in which Erdogan can talk to Trump, he can also talk to Putin. But Turkey maintains this relationship [as] transactional with Russia, while also, in several different theatres, basically fighting Russia’s proxies in outright wars. This happened in Syria; this happened in Libya. And of course, most famously, this happened in the South Caucasus, where Turkey backed Azerbaijan’s effort to retake its territories that were for 30 years occupied by Armenian forces with Russian support.
And all of these things Turkey has been able to do, taking out Russian proxies; Russia just says, okay, let’s move on, let’s not talk about it. And if you see, look at what happened in the South Caucasus in the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan – actually, in 2023, Turkey’s ally Azerbaijan actually mistakenly killed several Russian peacekeepers in that operation, and they just issued an apology. And the Russians didn’t even do anything. They just moved on. But what this speaks to is how much Russia, how much Turkey means to Russia, and how important maintaining this economic lifeline through Turkey means to the Russians. So, it’s really a very complex story.
Alan Makovsky
And if I could just add on that. The economic dependency goes both ways because Russia is the number one supplier of both gas and oil to Turkey. It’s long been dependent on Russian gas. They’ve tried to wean themselves off, but they still import about 40 percent of their gas, 35 to 40 percent of their gas from Russia, and a significant part of their oil. And Russia is building Turkey’s first nuclear reactor on the Mediterranean. Supposed to be, it’s been delayed many times, but the first reactor is supposed to be completed later this year, and Russia will own and operate that reactor and sell the electricity to Turkey. That’s the arrangement. So, I mean, Turkey remains very reliant on Russia, dependent on Russia, and it’s, as you say, been interesting. They’ve been able to outmaneuver Russia yet in several arenas that you noted—Syria, Libya, the South Caucasus.
Anyway, I just wanted to say, if I could, to bring it up to the back of the summit. The idea that Turkey is exceptional and can get away with things that other allies can’t. I thought it was very striking that President Trump excoriated all the allies for not supporting our effort, our war effort against Iran, and praised Erdogan for not joining the Iranian side. It was really giving it credit, and he said it’s more loyal than most other countries. It’s obviously a different standard [that] applies to Turkey, at least from President Trump’s point of view, than applies to other allies. Actually, I would just add that Turkey was actually the worst ally in terms of the Iran War; Turkey labelled it contrary to international law. [It] closed its airspace to U.S. aircraft and refused to let the U.S. use bases in Turkey. Arguably, Spain was just as bad. I think Turkey was a little louder about it, even than Spain. But yeah, I mean, rather than the best ally, it was the worst ally. But somehow, by not joining the Iranian side of the war, Turkey had done just great.
Blaise Misztal
Yeah, and unlike Spain, Turkey had to rely on NATO protections against Iranian missiles that entered its airspace and had sent a delegation just the day before the NATO summit to attend the funeral of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in Iran, which other U.S. regional partners like the Emirates refused to do, so certainly set a low bar there.
So, against that backdrop, Alan, and since you mentioned how Turkey seems to keep being viewed as exceptional, can you maybe fill us in on some of the developments during the summit in the U.S. Turkish relationship?
Alan Makovsky
Well, I think the big thing, as you mentioned at the top of the program, was that President Trump said that he plans to get rid of sanctions against Turkey, and he said that he would strongly consider selling the F-35 to Turkey. I think those are really the two big and related developments that came out of the summit in U.S. Turkish relations.
Blaise Misztal
Can you maybe sort of walk us through the significance of those? What are the sanctions he was referring to, and how does that relate to the F-35?
Alan Makovsky
So, the sanctions he’s referring to primarily are the CAATSA Sanctions, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, often just referred to as CAATSA, were imposed by Congress to prevent significant transactions with Russia’s intelligence and defense agencies. When Turkey bought the S-400 air defense equipment, it was expelled from the F-35 program and sanctions were put on its major arms purchasing agency, a government agency. That has complicated arms sales to Turkey.
Although we managed to find a way around that when we agreed to sell F-16s to Turkey, as a way to persuade Turkey to approve Sweden’s entry into NATO, as you alluded to earlier. The big sanction on Turkey, really, was a law passed by Congress in December 2019, as part of the National Defense Authorization Act. It said very explicitly that Turkey cannot purchase the F-35s unless it gives up possession of this S-400 air defense equipment that it had bought from Russia.
Since that time, that has probably been the number one issue in U.S.-Turkish relations from Turkey’s point of view. Erdogan badly wants the F-35 – its regional rival Greece has contracted to buy F-35s, which will start arriving, I believe, in 2028; Israel has had F-35s for nearly a decade. Israel was the first country, other than the United States, to get F-35s. And number one on Turkey’s shopping list, they’d like to get out of that restriction and buy F-35s. Now, I don’t think Trump can lift sanctions unilaterally. These are congressionally imposed. But the major issue, even if you got rid of CAATSA entirely, the law about restricting F-35 purchases would still be operative. So, that’s really the big issue.
By the way, I would just quickly add: he said you don’t sanction friends, but it so happens in his first term, he sanctioned Turkey on three different occasions. So, he seems not to remember that. He’s changed a few narratives about his relationship with Turkey in his first term.
Blaise Misztal
Yeah, so a couple points. First of all, to fully understand the F-35 issue, I’d recommend the report that Alan, Svante and Ambassador Edelman did last year on the issue called “Flight Risk,” which you can find on our website. But also just yesterday, my colleague Jonah Brody published an analysis of what the various legal barriers to selling the F-35 are, and what President Trump can and can’t do unilaterally.
But I guess in that context, Alan, as you pointed out, it’s that NDAA provision about Turkey possessing the S-400. That’s the real barrier here. In light of that, what’s the significance of the news that we’re hearing this morning that maybe Turkey is actually going to finally sell this thing?
Alan Makovsky
Well, of course, it’s highly significant. Turkey will have then met the standard of this legislation for eligibility for the F-35, so it will no longer possess the S-400, if this report is true; it was a report that came from a Turkish journalist very close to the Turkish government. Does that mean, automatically, that it will get the F-35s? Actually, in my opinion, yes. It probably does mean that.
However, there will be considerable resistance in Congress, and many congressmen have already made clear that they oppose Turkey’s getting the F-35 – for reasons of Turkey not being a good ally, because of its relations with Russia, because of its support for Hamas, because of its growing hostility to Israel, because of its occupation of the northern of Cyprus, and because of its longstanding rivalry with Greece. So, there are a lot of foreign policy arguments that opponents of the F-35 sale make.
That said, it’s very difficult to stop an arms sale that an administration wants to make if there are no legal barriers, like the 2019 law. It’s the only way you can stop an arms sale, really. There are various hurdles. Traditionally, if top congressmen object, the administration won’t put the sale forward. But the Trump administration is not expected to bow to those traditions. Congress’s only means of stopping an arms sale is through a joint resolution of disapproval, which it has to do within 15 days. It is very difficult for Congress to do anything within 15 days.
And even if it were to do such a thing – which has only happened once in history, as far as I know, when Congress did pass a joint resolution of disapproval for a Saudi arms sale that was, I believe, in 2019 – it’s just regular legislation. That means the president can veto it, which is what happened in the Saudi case. And then Congress needs a two-thirds majority of both houses to override the veto.
So I think it’s very unlikely when you have a Republican majority in the House and in the Senate, even though some of them do oppose the F-35 sale on strategic grounds, it’s very unlikely you’re going to get a two-thirds majority opposing it. So, I think if Turkey really is getting rid of the S-400, yeah, that’s probably a good bet that they’re going to actually get it.
Blaise Misztal
So, Svante, curious about whether you’re surprised to hear that Turkey might finally, after six years and all sorts of entreaties from the United States and threats, finally be ready to get rid of the S-400, and if so, why now? Why do you think Erdogan is displaying some flexibility now?
Svante Cornell
So that’s a good question. I’m, if anything, surprised that they didn’t find a way to get rid of the S-400s before. We should remind our audience that these S-400s have remained in boxes, in a warehouse somewhere. Who knows where? I mean, Alan probably knows where it is. But they haven’t been used. They haven’t even been unwrapped, if you will. So, the question is, if you have them in a hangar somewhere, why do you keep them? If this is what’s holding up, as Alan so clearly described, the purchase of the F-35s. So, several reasons.
One, probably the most important, is what it would do to the relationship with Russia. Having purchased these, you know Russia has, whether formally or informally, a say in where they go, and what is done, and whether it’s a loss of face for the Russians, and whether it would somehow affect the Turkish-Russian relationship. Or perhaps even more importantly, [how it would affect] the Putin-Erdogan personal relationship, if Turkey were to get rid of them. So why now?
I mean, you’re seeing all over the neighborhood of Russia how the former empire is cracking, and how states that five-to ten years ago would not have dared to challenge Russian interests are now doing so. You see it in Central Asia, for example; you see it in what happened between Azerbaijan and Armenia – it would have never happened if Russia had been stronger. The elephant in the room, of course, is how badly this war against Ukraine is going for Russia. How this war is, as we’ve seen, is directly affecting Russian cities, Russian energy, security, and the availability of gasoline and so on. So, the threshold, so to speak, for doing something that Mr. Putin might not like is not what it used to be 10 years ago or even several years ago.
I think Turkey feels that it [has] the upside, especially with President Trump in power and a more stable relationship, where they feel that, and I think, I think you just alluded to this, Alan. Or was it you, Blaise, that Erdogan said that President Trump always keeps his promises? This type of rhetoric suggests that there’s a personal trust between the leaders. Because, for Turkey, the worst situation would be you get rid of the S-400s, wherever they go. There are discussions to send them to Azerbaijan or now to a Gulf state, and suddenly then the U.S. wouldn’t deliver.
That would be a nightmare scenario: you end up with egg in your face, and you’ve undermined your relationship with the Russians, and you become kind of a laughingstock. So, I think the Turks are very heavily counting on this being realized; otherwise, they wouldn’t be getting rid of the S-400s.
Blaise Misztal
So, you’re saying that if Erdogan gets the F-35, he’ll have Zelensky to thank for it.
Svante Cornell
Yes.
Blaise Misztal
Alan, is the list of sanctions or legal obstacles to the sale of the F-35 the only considerations that should be going into the sale for the United States?
Alan Makovsky
It should be, yeah. Well, I mentioned to you that there are many voices in Congress, although it’s not clear that it would be a majority, that are objecting on strategic grounds because of the various issues I’ve raised. I think there’s plenty of reason to be concerned.
I share some of the concerns of those congressmen because of the aggressive role Turkey has played in the region, and because of its aggressive rhetoric. It has threatened that it might play a more difficult role, particularly, some of its rhetoric towards Israel. The foreign minister recently said that Israel has become a burden that humanity can no longer bear. Erdogan described Zionism as a genocidal occupying ideology. The Turkish Interior Minister said that he looks forward to Turkey’s return to running Jerusalem, and that he hopes to be the governor of Jerusalem.
These are very disturbing remarks, and I think Turkey’s attitudes towards Israel need to be clarified before any F-35 sale is completed. I think that’s really the most disturbing issue on the horizon, and of course Greece has reason to be concerned too. And Turkey’s attitude about the Aegean, where Turkey makes vast claims, something called the “Blue Homeland.” Now Greece also makes claims that Turkey doesn’t like. But I think it has to be clear that Turkey does not intend to use force on any of these issues, and actually, that Turkey will not interfere with ongoing projects that Greece and Cyprus have in their territorial waters and their EEZs.
So, I think it’s questionable whether we can sell it. Now, at a time when we’re saying that Europe has to get stronger, Turkey is a NATO member; it’s going to be hard to deny Turkey those F-35s. But do I personally have reservations? Yes, I do.
Blaise Misztal
So, Svante, given that you were just laying out some of Turkey’s newfound flexibility on the S-400, do you think that also will apply to some of these other friction areas that Alan laid out? Do you think that this is maybe a new direction for Erdogan, a new more cooperative, less aggressive Erdogan, or what should we expect from him if and when he gets the F-35?
Svante Cornell
Well, the general sense recently has been that Turkey is leaning back towards NATO and the U.S. because the bilateral relationship with the U.S. is better than it has been. I fully agree with everything Alan said.
The question with Turkey and especially with Erdogan and his government is always to what extent Turkish policy and Turkish rhetoric are the same thing. A lot of people that I speak to in Turkey think that a lot of the rhetoric, whether it be on Greece or the Aegean, or especially on Israel, is just that – it’s just theatre. It’s just feeding the base. Now, whether it’s rhetoric or not, it’s still profoundly harmful because it has helped to turn the tide in terms of Turkish society and outlook in Turkish society on issues like this. Because at the end of the day, the fish rots from the head, so to speak, and obviously the situation today is extremely far from what we had a few decades ago, when Turkey and Israel were allied countries for all practical purposes. So that’s the question.
I think even if you’re just feeding the base with rhetoric, sometimes your base becomes a Frankenstein. So, I’m not at all trying to minimize the dangers, or not just the dangers, but also the nature of the rhetoric that President Erdogan and his close advisers are using. But very frequently, we’ve seen that Turkish actions and Turkish rhetoric are very far from each other, whereas the rhetoric has been a lot stronger, and the actions have basically not been there. For many years, Turkey has threatened one of the oil exploration or gas exploration vessels that were in the Aegean or in the Eastern Mediterranean; to what extent is that today preventing the development of these resources? I’m not sure, so it’s a difficult determination to make.
Turkey seems to find its relationship with the West more important than it did. That also has to do with the fact that Western countries are interfering less with Erdogan’s power or aspirations to maintain power and consolidate control. I think that’s probably the main reason Turkey has today a positive relationship with both European countries and with the United States. Whereas in the past, there were a lot of actions taken, even though they were not serious. But it was a constant irritant for Erdogan that Turkey was exposed to Western pressure on human rights and on democracy. Now we see the closure essentially of the main opposition party, and nobody’s even mentioning it.
So, I think that with Erdogan, whatever the rhetoric, yes, he is a deeply ideological person. I don’t think there’s a question about that, and I’ve written about that myself. But I think the older he’s gotten, the more the control, the power, and the control over assets and power has become more central. And as long as that’s not challenged, I think he can be a transactional partner in many ways.
Blaise Misztal
Yeah, to that last point, Alan, the NATO charter describes itself as an organization that’s dedicated to democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Was there any mention of human rights and all of the recent Turkish attempts to shut down opposition that Svante alluded to during the Ankara summit?
Alan Makovsky
Not to my knowledge; there’s been no mention. I think it’s unlikely that Turkey, if it were not in NATO and applying for NATO membership today, and if NATO were taking that part of the charter that you quoted seriously, there’s no way that Turkey could join NATO. But for now, human rights has simply fallen off the table in favor of strategic issues broadly.
But also, Europe is concerned about refugees, and since 2016 it’s basically had an arrangement with Turkey, where Turkey would not allow its refugee population to flow westward towards Europe, and that supersedes concerns about human rights. So, you could chart it: since 2016, Europe talks less about human rights, and of course, for the Biden administration, it’s not an issue. I mean, human rights just simply isn’t on the table. The Biden administration said human rights was going to be at the center of its foreign policy, but that in fact did not happen. And to be fair to Trump, the Biden administration also did not put much emphasis on human rights.
So we’re not hearing the types of criticisms we heard about Turkey, let’s say a decade and more ago, regarding human rights, and we sure didn’t hear it at the NATO summit, and we’re not likely to hear it very much in the near future. The European Parliament will pass a resolution now and then. There are some issues that come up in the Council of Europe, which is a separate organization. But these are like little squeaks compared with the chorus of criticism that used to descend on Turkey, in that regard.
Blaise Misztal
I do want to open it up to questions from the audience. So, if you do have any thoughts, our panelists, please feel free to submit them using the Q and A function in Zoom, and I’ll read them out. But then, yes, Svante, go ahead.
Svante Cornell
I just wanted to mention there is an issue we haven’t discussed in terms of Turkey’s role in NATO, which has to do with the change in the relationship between the United States and Europe.
With the statements that President Trump has made repeatedly about NATO, putting in question America’s commitment to the defense of Europe and even to our NATO Article Five, and the most absolutely central part of this, of course, was the controversy over Greenland. All of these things have meant that for European powers, if it’s a low risk, for the first time people are talking about what would happen if the U.S. was not committed to its role in NATO.
And then you have a reality for the European Union that perhaps the two most central powers in Europe are not EU countries. It’s the United Kingdom and Turkey in terms of military power, and you could add France to that list, perhaps, and increasingly, of course, Poland in the future. So you know, we keep talking about Turkey as the second largest land force in NATO. That means if the Europeans have come to question America’s commitment to Europe, it’s a no-brainer that, for the security and strategic reasons Alan alluded to, you are going to swallow your pride. You will not mention these human rights issues, because now it’s about the security of Europe itself.
We should remember that many of the high defense officials and military officials in Europe have these quotes every week or so about when or if Russia is going to be in a position or have a willingness to threaten Article Five in NATO, by some kind of plausible deniability operation in a Baltic state against Poland.
So, I think we absolutely have to see the status of Turkey for the European members of NATO completely against this background.
Blaise Misztal
I guess on that, Svante and Alan, two things.
One is, in 2015 during the Syrian war, a Turkish jet got shot down by Russian air defenses and Turkey at least made some noises about wanting NATO to invoke Article Five and collective self-defense. Basically, everyone said nothing or laughed them out of the room or turned their backs.
So, given that Turkey’s relationship with Moscow, that we discussed earlier, is the mood, Svante, in Stockholm, really that they expect Turkish troops are going to come to Sweden’s defense if Russian forces come across the border?
Svante Cornell
No, but beggars can’t be choosers.
The level of panic that has seeped through Europe in the last year or two as a result of the perceived threat from Russia, and as a result of the feeling that you cannot trust the United States anymore, and this sense of panic is all the more acute in the two countries that are the most recent to join NATO. You know, Sweden and Finland joined, feeling like, okay, we’re finally secure, and then suddenly, this anchor of NATO that you thought was going to protect you might not do that anymore.
In that situation, you see all kinds of bilateral deals being made with the British, with the French. I wouldn’t be surprised at all if these types of bilateral deals are made with Turkey. Countries in Northern Europe are talking about deals with France to take part in the French nuclear umbrella. I mean, this is what’s happening in Europe these days.
So, to the extent that you can bring the second largest military force in Turkey closer to you, you tip the balance, you increase the deterrence, the deterrence against the Russians to do something that would harm their relationship, not just with NATO, but with Turkey, which is so important to them.
Alan Makovsky
I completely agree with Svante, and I think that was one of the reasons Turkey wanted to have this summit, saying it’s symbolic to have it in Turkey. Because Turkey wants to be integrated into European defense, into the new European defense structure, to be at the center of it.
But we have to remember that most NATO states are also members of the European Union, and as one Turkish diplomat said to me once, that at times these seem like two different organizations, two different mindsets, even though it’s largely the same countries. And any sort of formal integration of Turkey, at least into the EU effort, is going to require approval from Greece and Cyprus, and so far Turkey is being kept out of the program. I’m forgetting what the acronym SAFE stands for, you may remember, but that is the program to plan for European defense integration. Turkey is having some success doing bilateral co-production deals with Italy and with Spain, but I think it makes sense strategically for Turkey to be integrated and to be an important center for producing security for Europe, but it’s by no means a done deal.
I wanted to go back to the Israel discussion for a second, if I could. I just wanted to say I’m not saying that Turkey is about to attack Israel. I agree that most of this is rhetoric, and Turkey has no real interest in attacking Israel, but as the rhetoric gets heated up, one doesn’t know. As we’ve pointed out, despite the rhetoric, Turkey and Israel have great economic relations.
But ultimately, pressure on Erdogan from his right wing led him to end that trade and to boycott Israel. You just never know, particularly with Turkish military and Israeli militaries cheek by jowl in Syria and now in Somalia. You just never know where this heated rhetoric could end, and I certainly hope the U.S., behind the scenes, is working hard to make sure that the rhetoric stays only at the rhetoric level. But sometimes these things get out of control.
So if we’re going to sell them F-35s, I think there has to be some kind of explicit understanding. So that’s all I was trying to say.
Blaise Misztal
Yeah, maybe related to that, Alan, we could end with this question.
There was an interview with Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who was asked about whether Turkey was interested in nuclear weapons or pursuing nuclear weapons, and he just sort of smiled and evaded the question. And actually, I was in Israel recently, and officials there told us that it’s their understanding that Fidan had actually specifically asked for that question to be asked of him.
So, what are we to make of his non-answer, and should there be any concern about Turkey’s interest or pursuit of nuclear weapons, given as you said that the Russian-built reactor is already there?
Alan Makovsky
Well, I think we don’t want to see the nuclear club grow at all, and Turkey is under the U.S. umbrella. But I do think there is Turkish interest in it. They see Iran possibly moving towards nuclear status or arguably an already nuclear threshold state. And Israel, of course, has nuclear arms, although it doesn’t acknowledge it. It’s an open secret. It’s not surprising that states like Turkey and Saudi Arabia would also be interested in acquiring nuclear arms. And this sort of budding quartet that Turkey has been talking about with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, I think in the back of Turkey’s mind, it probably has a nuclear dimension because Pakistan is a nuclear state.
Blaise Misztal
Svante, last word goes to you.
Svante Cornell
Well, I mean, I think for the last several years, actually for fairly long now, we’ve been living in a world where collective security is increasingly unreliable. If the Europeans are worried about the American security umbrella, why should Turkey trust the U.S. nuclear security umbrella? So, I think the risk that one other state in this region works towards getting nuclear weapons is fairly high. Whether it’s the Saudis or the Turks who move first, we’ll have to see. But I’m sure that if one moves, the other will too. And at the end of the day, it all depends on Iran.
We have to remember that for the past 50 years or more, almost 50 years, I should say, the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the prime mover for all kinds of security issues in this region and has been the one that everybody else has reacted to. This is true for the Gulf states, this is true for Israel, this is true for Turkey. Now, Iran may be reduced in size, which will reduce the feeling among other states that it may have to acquire nuclear weapons. But that depends on how this war ends and what Iran looks like in a year or two.
Blaise Misztal
And whether or not it has F-35s, perhaps.
So, Svante, Alan, thank you very much for your time and your analysis today. Thank you to the audience who tuned in.
If you want more Turkey analysis, please check out our Benjamin Gettler Center for East Med Security at our website jinsa.org, where the best Turkey analysis to be found in D.C. is available. And very much look forward to seeing you on the next webinar.
Thank you, and have a good afternoon, everyone.