For Gaza’s ‘Day After,’ Look to Private Security Companies

Could private security companies — known as PSCs — play a role in defeating Hamas and kick-starting the transition to a better “day after” in Gaza? Despite PSCs having a checkered history, reports suggest that several key stakeholders, including Israel and the United Arab Emirates, are considering using them to help protect operations essential to Gaza’s relief and recovery — and to breaking Hamas’s grip on power. While perhaps no one’s first choice for securing a new administration in Gaza, PSCs may end up being the most realistic option for finally getting the “day after” started.

That was the conclusion of a bipartisan task force that I chaired earlier this year, supported by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America and The Vandenberg Coalition. Before reaching it, the task force closely examined the most frequently discussed options for securing a post-Hamas transition and found them all wanting.

Israel’s Defense Forces, the IDF, have their hands full crushing Hamas militarily – not to mention dealing with threats from Lebanon and Iran. The IDF doesn’t have the resources, manpower, or legitimacy to also secure key civilian missions like delivering aid, clearing rubble, restoring essential services, and recruiting new Palestinian leaders.

US forces, though capable, are also a non-starter. There’s no political appetite in Washington for committing US troops to nation-building in Gaza.

For many reasons, a UN force also seems out of the question. Most importantly, given the abject failure of UN peacekeepers since 2006 to keep Hezbollah at bay in Lebanon, it’s hard to imagine Israelis relying on them to help secure Gaza.

As for the Palestinian Authority (PA), Israel’s right-wing government has rejected allowing it to play any role in Gaza. But even if Israel was willing, the reality is that the PA can’t secure its West Bank stronghold. It’s fanciful to believe that 17 years after being thrown out of Gaza by Hamas, PA police could now return with greater success.

By far, the most popular proposal for securing the “day after” involves deploying troops from Arab states. But there’s no indication they would sign on while the IDF is still active inside Gaza fighting Hamas remnants. Even harder to fathom: Arab troops killing Palestinians, fellow Muslims, who violently resist efforts to undermine Hamas’s control.

After dismissing the most frequently proposed security models, our task force offered the practical, but controversial option of hiring PSCs to help protect any new civilian administration in Gaza – whether it be led by the PA, some inter-Arab stabilization authority, or (as our task force recommended) a private multinational Trust backed by Washington and its regional partners.

Many PSCs have long records supporting the operations of the US military during the war on terror. Their ranks are filled with well-trained professionals who served at elite levels in their nation’s military. They have ample experience conducting the kinds of missions that would be critical in Gaza’s war-torn landscape, including protecting humanitarian convoys, guarding critical infrastructure, and securing VIPS. PSCs are also well acquainted with the imperative of coordinating their activities with a national army in control of the overall battlespace – in Gaza’s case, the IDF.

Without question, high-profile cases of abuse have tarnished PSCs in many eyes. Most notoriously, in Iraq in 2007, employees of the US company Blackwater protecting a convoy killed 17 civilians in the Nisour Square Massacre.

Less well-known is that after Nisour Square, the US military imposed a comprehensive oversight regime for PSCs, including strict rules of engagement, monitoring, and accountability. The US commanders responsible told our task force that it worked extremely well. They believed that with a similar regime in Gaza, PSCs could also make important contributions there.

Of course, concerns about abuse aren’t unique to PSCs. Absent good leadership and real accountability, even the best militaries in the world, including the US military, are susceptible to misbehavior. As for UN peacekeepers, their missions over the years have been repeatedly plagued by corruption, mismanagement, and sex crimes.

In fact, there’s a strong argument that when things do go wrong, as they inevitably will in a place like Gaza where the enemy observes no laws of armed conflict, PSC wrongdoing will be easier to manage than that of a national military. The latter invariably implicates diplomatic sensitivities surrounding national honor and saving face. If a PSC misbehaves, in contrast, its personnel can be quickly disciplined and expelled from the battlespace with far less political blowback.

The transition to a better “day after” in Gaza will never get off the ground unless it can be secured. As Winston Churchill famously underscored about democracies versus other systems of government, PSCs may be the worst option for establishing a post-Hamas administration except for all the other options proposed.

John Hannah, senior fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, served in both Republican and Democratic administrations, including as national security advisor to former Vice President Dick Cheney.

Originally published by Times of Israel.