Iran’s Next Move Is the Bomb—If the Regime Survives

As the United States and Israel continue to decimate Iran’s conventional capabilities, it becomes clearer that their campaign cannot stop until at least one of two objectives is achieved: the collapse of the Tehran regime, or the end of its nuclear program. If the regime survives, it will be even more determined and desperate to go nuclear.

The Tehran regime already understood that giving up on a nuclear program is a recipe for being invaded, as happened with Ukraine; toppled like Bashar al-Assad; or invaded, toppled, and killed like Moamar Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein. Meanwhile, North Korea achieved nuclear weapons and its impoverished hermit regime remains safely in power. This history lesson is even clearer now that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other top officials have been eliminated. Assuming it survives in some form, the regime will have every incentive to secure the ultimate deterrent against another such war.

After being pummeled so heavily last June and again now, how might the regime still pursue the bomb? The foremost concern is its stockpile of 10-12 bombs’ worth of 60 percent highly enriched uranium (HEU). Much of this is believed to be enclosed in tunnels at Isfahan after U.S. strikes last June, with perhaps other amounts entombed at Fordow and/or Natanz following U.S.-Israeli strikes on those facilities. Western intelligence agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agree with Iran’s foreign minister that the country might have relocated at least some of these stocks to parts unknown shortly before Midnight Hammer.

Can these be accessed, and if so, how easily or detectably? In particular, the HEU inside Isfahan could be retrievable. Unlike the Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOP) that burrowed into Fordow, Isfahan was deemed too deep for even these most powerful bunker busters. It was hit with cruise missiles with the more modest goal of collapsing the tunnel entrances but not demolishing the site. Iran has since hardened the tunnels against further attacks and potentially sought to access the contents therein.

Second, what is happening at undeclared sites? Right before Israel struck last summer, Iran announced a new site near Isfahan. It also spent several years digging a separate secret facility into “Pickaxe” mountain, near Natanz, that reportedly is too far underground to be damaged by MOPs. Construction and fortification work at Pickaxe between the 12-Day War and the current conflict presumably prompted President Trump’s comment that the “regime was trying to reconstitute its weapons program” at this site “protected by granite.” Have some of Iran’s HEU stocks, potential secret centrifuges, or other infrastructure been moved to these locations? In the run-up to the war last summer, Iran also developed new uranium ore mines that could serve as secret storage sites.

Assuming a mere tenth of its HEU survived intact, Iran could convert this material to warhead-grade purity in a few weeks with a handful of centrifuges at Pickaxe or the new site near Isfahan. Even if all its centrifuges have been destroyed, it could use the same amount of HEU to make a crude, but testable, device without further enrichment.

Iran’s capacity to turn this material into a weapon is the final big question. Despite its suspected bomb-making sites and personnel being hit hard in October 2024, June 2025, and March 2026, Tehran’s decades of systematic lying to inspectors leave extensive unresolved concerns about residual weaponization capabilities and know-how. Just this month, suspected efforts to resume such work prompted renewed Israeli airstrikes.

These worries were grave enough for the IAEA to declare Iran in breach of its safeguards right before the 12-Day War. And the day preceding the current conflict, IAEA Director Rafael Grossi warned publicly that he cannot confidently answer each of the core questions listed here. His agency has not visited Pickaxe, and it does not know the actual location of the new Isfahan facility. Nor has it been to known sites at Natanz, Isfahan, or Fordow since Iran’s possible relocation of HEU last June.

What is unquestionable is the Iranian regime’s incentive, assuming it survives this war, to finish a bomb as quickly and surreptitiously as possible—in particular, a crude device that debuts Tehran’s nuclear deterrent with a mushroom cloud in the desert.

We assume American, Israeli, and other Western intelligence agencies share these questions, and more. If they think they have answers, how high is their confidence level? We trust President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu care deeply about these issues, for which they embarked on this war. Whatever they decide, it should be based on a solution that outlasts their leadership.

If the Iranian regime collapses, a new more liberal political order could well resolve these concerns. But if the regime survives, which is very possible, America and Israel must ensure its nuclear dreams are stymied completely and permanently.