Finishing the Job: Targeting Iran’s Repression Machine

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Executive Summary:

Despite President Donald Trump’s claim during his April 1 speech that “regime change has occurred” in Iran with new “less radical” and “reasonable” authorities in place, the same repressive theocracy continues to hold power. By the president’s own admissions, the rulers in Tehran have killed hundreds of Americans, as well as thousands of Iranians, and the Iranian people remain “petrified” of protesting because “one side has guns, and they have very nasty guns… and what they do is they shoot you. The people are brave, but they’re not brave when they see people gunned down left and right.” Until the regime can no longer prevent Iranians from removing it from power, it will continue to endanger the United States, its partners, and the Iranian people. The United States and Israel should, therefore, prepare for operations to target and degrade Iran’s security apparatus.

Targeting Iran’s internal security forces requires specific operations because these small, decentralized units operate in ways that make them difficult to distinguish from the civilian population. This type of operation also requires significant surveillance and strike assets, which are currently in high demand for other targets. Once the war ends, Washington will want to redeploy much of the force posture it has surged to the region, particularly its crewed aircraft.

Overcoming these challenges requires a rapid, reliable intelligence network and strike assets specifically devoted to targeting the entire system of personnel and infrastructure that repress the Iranian people, while minimizing risks to civilians. A frequent aircraft presence above Iranian skies, both during and after major combat operations, should conduct flyovers of major cities, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and strike operations. This combination would help deter regime forces, intensify psychological pressure, and enable swift responses against attacks on civilians or attempts to rebuild Iran’s military and nuclear programs. Extending help to the Iranian people after the war requires maintaining the political will and capabilities in the region to continue monitoring Iran’s repression apparatus and quickly respond if necessary. Support will also need to ensure opposition forces have necessary communications and weapons resources. Regardless of whether the war ends through a negotiated ceasefire or a unilateral U.S.-Israeli decision to stop, the United States should not enter into any agreement that legitimizes the regime, grants it concessions, or restricts continued operations over Iran.

To pursue this effort both during and after the war, the U.S. Department of Defense should provide U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) with enough drones and precision missiles for rapid, targeted strikes that can reach hidden security forces while minimizing civilian harm. Drone operations should track mobile units and checkpoints. Iran has already shown that its remaining air defenses can shoot down fighter aircraft, and post-war air operations would likely face a more contested airspace as Iran rebuilds its air defense capacity. These factors increase the value of drone operations, while electronic warfare aircraft can suppress regime communications and air defense radars. The United States and Israel should also further covertly arm opposition groups with small arms and man-portable drones and expand transfers of secure communications platforms capable of circumventing signal tracking methods. Acting now to preposition and distribute these capabilities will enable long-term operational momentum.