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Port Insecurity

Grant the President this: There is more than a little anti-Arab sentiment in the uproar over a Dubai firm purchasing the British operating company running terminals at six major American seaports. Otherwise, how do you explain the lack of concern over Chinese companies running terminals at two major West Coast ports and New Orleans, the locus of much of our energy imports? Or about the original British company when there are probably as many jihadists in Britain today as there are in Dubai?

Grant the President this: There is more than a little anti-Arab sentiment in the uproar over a Dubai firm purchasing the British operating company running terminals at six major American seaports. Otherwise, how do you explain the lack of concern over Chinese companies running terminals at two major West Coast ports and New Orleans, the locus of much of our energy imports? Or about the original British company when there are probably as many jihadists in Britain today as there are in Dubai? Yesterday, the Department of Homeland Security was still trying to figure out the ownership of terminal management in all 361 U.S. ports.

The Coast Guard does, and will continue to do, port security and the tracking of ships, crews and cargo. The Customs Service does, and will continue to do, screening in the ports. The real problem is twofold – and applies to all foreign terminal ownership: first, that a management company could facilitate infiltration of people or weapons into the U.S.; and second that company officials would be briefed on American security procedures which, if given to terrorists, would make security much easier to breech.

There are two ancillary, but also real problems. The Dubai company is government-owned. The current government of the UAE is pro-American, but change in the Middle East is nerve-wracking at best. Second, the company runs terminals in places including Venezuela – having a Middle Eastern company control both ends where one end is increasingly close to Iran is even more problematic.

We are indebted to Advisory Board Member Stephen Bryen, a former Pentagon official, for pointing out that American defense companies with partial foreign ownership are required to have an American Security Board responsible for issues which, if controlled by foreign interests – even allied interests – would make Americans nervous. Accepting the rules and the authority of the Security Board is part of the deal. No Board, no deal. More than one sale fell through on that point, which is just fine with us.

Ports are not military installations, but they are considered “critical infrastructure” under an Executive Order signed by President George H.W. Bush. So why not have American Security Boards for all of America’s ports? Why not prevent Chinese, Danish, Singaporean, South Korean and British as well as Dubai owners from getting an inside look at American security practices?

The American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA) points out that not only do American ports handle 95 percent of America’s overseas commerce and 10 million cruise passengers annually, “They also enable deployment of U.S. military vessels, personnel and cargo to support our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, while ensuring the ability of relief organizations to ship critical supplies to areas of the world hard hit by man-made and natural disasters, such as the tsunami catastrophe… 16 million jobs… $2 trillion worth of international trade annually… 27 percent of the nation’s GDP.”

You’d think we’d want to protect all that and not only from Dubai. It’s time to have a real policy to protect the management of our ports from all foreign ownership.