Stop the Wishful Thinking on Syria
The United States must call the killing of two American servicemen and a civilian interpreter in Syria earlier this month what it was: an attack by a member of the Syrian security forces on U.S. troops. Pretending otherwise will only invite further bloodshed.
The horrific death of three Americans – the first combat deaths in President Trump’s second term – was not an isolated act of terrorism carried out by an external enemy slipping across porous borders or hiding in the desert. It was an attack from within the very institutions that the international community has begun to treat as legitimate partners.
The Syrian interior ministry confirmed that the attacker was a member of the security services under investigation for extremism. Framing the incident solely as an “ISIS attack” obscures the institutional nature of the threat and misleads policymakers and the American public.
The tragedy is a consequence of rushed normalization with a transitional Syrian government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, the former jihadist who started Syria’s branch of the Islamic State, Jabhat al-Nusra, and later pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda. Mr. al-Sharaa’s government does not have the inclination or capacity to thoroughly rid its security services of radical Islamist elements.
Syria’s new security institutions are overstretched, under-vetted and deeply compromised by extremist ideology. In its rush to consolidate control and project sovereignty, Damascus has absorbed thousands of fighters and commanders from violent extremist groups, many of them foreign fighters. These include divisions incorporated from the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA), members of which participated in the ethnic violence against Syria’s Alawite minority in March and whose commanders are accused of war crimes.
The Turkistan Islamic Party, a group the United States sanctioned in a previous form for its association with al-Qaida and the Taliban, is also now part of Mr. al-Sharaa’s security apparatus.
Worse yet, instruction in Islamist ideology is a prerequisite for new recruits. The Syrian army may wear state uniforms but retain jihadist sympathies.
Mr. Trump wrote last week on Truth Social that the U.S. was “inflicting very serious retaliation, just as I promised, on the murderous terrorists responsible” for the deaths of the three Americans. The objective of the operation was to target places in the vast Syrian desert where ISIS is known to have significant infrastructure. However, with Assad gone, Islamic State group fighters have found Syria’s new security institutions to be an ideal cover, allowing them to blend in with alarming ease.
If Washington is serious about protecting American lives, safeguarding hard-won counterterrorism gains and giving Syria a genuine chance at stability, it must recalibrate its approach now, before normalization turns into strategic self-deception.
First, Mr. Trump should immediately demand that Congress reverse its misguided efforts to repeal the last leverage the United States has with Damascus: the Caesar Act sanctions.
Second, the United States must press Damascus to identify, isolate and remove individuals with extremist affiliations or sympathies in its Ministries of Defense and Interior. Counterterrorism cannot succeed if jihadist ideology is tolerated inside state institutions.
Third, the United States must maintain its existing counter-ISIS partnerships in northeast Syria. The partnership with the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — which led to the territorial defeat of the Islamic State group under the first Trump administration — remains the most reliable counterterrorism asset on the ground. Abandoning trusted partners in favor of untested institutions would be strategically reckless and morally indefensible.
A Syria that cannot safely cooperate with the international community against ISIS risks becoming a launchpad for endless conflict and transnational terror threats. Governments and businesses will think twice before taking advantage of sanctions relief if they fear violence from the very institutions tasked with protecting their investments.
Furthermore, Israel will be far less likely to enter into any meaningful security arrangement with a Syrian government it believes is harboring Islamic State group operatives within its own forces.
The U.S. has policy achievements to build on. It has leverage, trusted partner and a viable framework in the March 10 agreement. What it cannot afford is complacency or wishful thinking. Syria’s path to stability will not be paved by photo-ops, but by hard decisions about who wields power.
Washington needs to be clear about the serious jihadist threats lurking in the ranks of its new Syrian partner. Deeper security cooperation with the United States can stabilize Syria and usher in a more secure and prosperous future for the country—but only if Mr. al-Sharaa purges his forces of extremists first.
Originally published in Washington Times.