No specific weapons transfer can ensure Israel is able to block Tehran’s nuclear ambitions on its own—even an MOP.
The right weapons are critical to success in battle, but at some point, generals have to fight with what they’ve got.
That means Israel will likely have to attack Iran’s nuclear program without receiving the massive ordnance penetrator (MOP), the world’s largest bunker buster, from the United States.
In 2014, we first proposed the idea that President Barack Obama provide Israel with MOPs, the only conventional weapon capable of directly penetrating Iran’s deeply-buried Fordow nuclear facility.
As Iran approaches the nuclear threshold, policy experts are taking this idea more seriously. It was also drafted into legislation last year.
Transferring U.S. bombers to deliver the MOP was always a long shot. At 30,000 pounds, the MOP is designed for use by B-2 bombers, and is too massive for deployment by any Israeli Air Force plane.
Newfound proponents of giving Israel the MOP therefore call for Washington to lend Jerusalem B-2s as well. That is a non-starter. The United States has made clear it will never share with anyone such strategic and stealthy aircraft so critical to our deterrence, especially since the United States only has nineteen of them. It is very unlikely that President Trump will change this policy.
Thus, we originally called for providing Israel with decommissioned B-52H bombers built more than sixty years ago. These are the only other MOP-compatible aircraft, but they have only used this weapon in controlled tests.
Either option has major drawbacks. Israel would need to lengthen certain runways, develop new tactical doctrines, install proprietary avionics and other systems, and train the crews. A former Israeli deputy air commander likened it to “buying a pair of shoes many sizes too large.”
Growing into those shoes, while a bold suggestion, certainly seemed worthwhile in 2014. Back then, Iran’s nuclear program was smaller and easier to target, giving the United States and Israel time to iron out these details. As a signal of intent, just starting this process might have compelled Iran into a much better nuclear deal than the awful JCPOA that emerged the following year.
Today, Tehran could produce a considerable quantity of fissile material, and potentially finish a bomb in less time than it would take for Israel to prepare to use the MOP. Temporarily “lend-leasing” B-52s wouldn’t shortcut Israel’s prep time, nor is it analogous to the World War II policy that essentially donated expendable weapons en masse to our allies.
Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is dispersed and resilient, precisely to limit the damage that such powerful bunker busters could inflict.
The window of opportunity for a military campaign is in the coming months. This is due to Iran’s nuclear advances, Israel’s severe weakening of Hezbollah (Iran’s second strike deterrent), and its recent destruction of Iran’s advanced air defenses using F-35s this past fall. At this very late stage, if Israel is preparing a kinetic campaign, it must do so with the military it has—and we expect that it has capabilities of which the United States is not aware.
What Israel truly needs, and what Tehran truly fears, is not some specific munition, even one as potent as the MOP.
Instead, Israel would prefer the United States partner with it in a military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities. At the very least, it would like American support in intelligence, air defense, refueling, and perhaps neutralizing Iran’s missile launchers. But most important, perhaps, is America’s commitment to convey to Iran that it will target the Tehran regime and perhaps other critical military and economic sites in Iran should the latter seek to expand the war in retaliation. Neither Israel, America, nor America’s Arab allies want a regional war to erupt.
Time is running out to reverse Iran’s nuclear march. It is too late to provide Israel with a complex weapon system new to their military. But it is not too late to communicate that there is no daylight between the United States and Israel on rolling back Iran’s nuclear progress, and for Washington to help ensure Israel’s military campaign will be effective. This is vital for the security interests of both nations.
Michael Makovsky, PhD is President and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA).
Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (ret.), the retired former Chief of Air Force Intelligence and a key air-campaign planner for Operations Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom, is a JINSA Senior Advisor.
Originally published in the National Interest.