The United States Must Continue Showing Resolve to Prevent an Iranian Nuclear Weapon
US and Israeli leaders are taking a well-deserved victory lap after their historic achievements against Iran. While visiting the White House, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu correctly observed the two countries’ successes “changed the face of the Middle East.” Yet vigilance is still required.
Neither country can afford to chalk one up in the win column and pivot elsewhere. Despite the immense damage to its nuclear facilities — and missile, conventional military, and proxy efforts — Iran is down, but not out. To ensure Iran does not rebuild, the United States and Israel should signal their will and capacity to further punish Iran militarily if needed, while pursuing an intensive economic and diplomatic pressure campaign against it.
Operation Midnight Hammer, the monumental US strike campaign which Secretary of State Marco Rubio rightly called the stuff of “science fiction,” severely impeded Iran’s nuclear progress. American officials estimate its nuclear program was potentially delayed by two years. However, Iran could have spirited away enriched uranium stocks before the strikes, or maintain them at covert undeclared sites.
Iran, on July 2, further limited the world’s already grainy picture into its nuclear status, suspending cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — just days after the IAEA chief said 900 pounds of enriched uranium remain unaccounted for.
Even in the best-case scenario, Iran is a diminished but sizable threat. While Israel eliminated numerous Iranian launchers and ballistic missiles, hundreds remain capable of striking US partners and personnel regionally. Iran’s progress towards long-range strike capability is also concerning. Years of Iranian development of space launch vehicles, as a US official observed, isn’t for Iran “to go to the moon” but rather “to build an [intercontinental ballistic missile] so they can one day put a warhead on it.”
Historically, after major setbacks to their nuclear programs, nuclear-threshold states have either been deterred from external aggression — like Syria in 2007 — or escalated it to compensate. Tehran may opt for the latter category — and, indeed, its Houthi surrogates have significantly ramped up their attacks on Israel and commercial ships in the weeks since the war concluded. Iran itself, forced to slow its nuclear progress under US pressure in 2003, began facilitating terrorist attacks on American troops in neighboring Iraq. After Israeli strikes devastated its burgeoning nuclear program in 1981, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq escalated its war against Iran by deploying chemical weapons, then in 1991 invaded Kuwait and tried to invade Saudi Arabia. Two years after an American-led coalition foiled its expansionist plans, Iraq tried to kill former President George H.W. Bush.
Iran cannot be allowed to follow in these baleful footsteps. The United States must force the regime to make a choice: either swallow the poison chalice and abandon its decades long malign projects, or taste more of the same bitter medicine Israel and America administered last month. This is particularly vital in the near-term, before Iran can restore its vanquished air defenses or acquire new ones — rendering future strikes against it riskier and potentially costlier.
US officials must clearly articulate how the Iranian regime can avoid further scathing. A recent report published by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) laid out the criteria that should trigger unilateral or bilateral strikes. These include indications that Iran is rebuilding strategic air defenses, long-range missiles, or missile launchers; utilizing enriched uranium or nuclear equipment; operating secret nuclear sites; or acquiring military or nuclear capabilities from abroad.
Ideally, though, the threat of such repeated military strikes would convince Iran to agree to a new agreement to give up its nuclear and missile programs. Iran’s unprecedented vulnerability gives President Trump a strategic opening to craft a deal Iran can’t refuse, though one with airtight restrictions. These include Iran forfeiting all nuclear and nuclear-adjacent capabilities, including nuclear-capable missiles and missile production sites, and conceding to a total embargo on its nuclear and military imports and exports. Iran’s continued compliance with its Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations and IAEA inspections should be non-negotiable — and said inspections made unprecedentedly intrusive.
Even if a good deal proves elusive, the United States should continue solidifying its leverage over, and deterrence against, the Iranian regime. Sensible measures include adopting an enhanced economic pressure campaign and encouraging European allies to snapback United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran. An agreement declaring Washington backs future Israeli action in Iran under certain circumstances, like the one inked in December 2024 concerning Hezbollah in Lebanon, would also boost leverage.
Crucially, the United States and Israel must display their willingness and capability to resume strikes at a moment’s notice. The United States should expeditiously provide Israel with aerial refuelers, multirole combat jets, precision munitions, and kinetic interceptors. US warplanes also should either conduct overflights, or publicly back Israeli overflights, to reaffirm both nations’ freedom of action in Iranian skies.
The United States and Israel, having achieved historic success by working in concert on the battlefield, must maintain momentum and demonstrate to Iran and the world their continued resolve. US leaders must vow consequences if Iran tries to reconstitute its missile, nuclear, and proxy terror programs — and make good on their word.
RADM Paul Becker, USN (ret.) is former Director of Intelligence (J2) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a participant in the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) 2024 Generals and Admirals Program, and a member of JINSA’s Board of Advisors.
Yoni Tobin is a senior policy analyst at JINSA.
Originally published in Algemeiner.