The U.S. Needs an Information-Warfare Strategy for Iran — And Beyond

The United States has demonstrated impressive combat power in the conflict with Iran. And yet, when Iranian authorities shut down the country’s internet and communications earlier this year during the nationwide anti-regime protests and Operation Epic Fury, the US was unprepared to help Iranian civilians combat their government’s repressive tactics.

That remains a flaw in America’s ongoing campaign and should be one of the key takeaways from the Iran conflict. The US government must take steps to avoid repeating these shortcomings and develop plans to enable civilians to freely communicate in any country where a shutdown is possible.

The internet drove Iranian protests by enabling civilians to organize efforts to oppose the regime. To hinder those protests and further repress dissent, the regime shut down the internet nationwide. Despite restoring internet access in late May after an 88-day blackout intended to prevent an uprising during the 2026 war, the regime continues to heavily filter civilian communications, retains sophisticated tools to detect citizens using virtual private networks (VPNs) and unauthorized satellite internet services like Starlink, and maintains the ability to impose another nationwide blackout if unrest surges.

With access to circumvention tools, civilians living under repressive governments, such as in Iran, China, Myanmar and Cuba, could better resist these restrictions; but the currently available tools are either too expensive, or too easily blocked.

VPNs, for example, can be costly for civilians and vulnerable to authorities’ monitoring and interference — a common problem for Iranians. The US government previously supported private companies that provided VPNs to civilians in countries with internet restrictions like Iran, China and Russia via the Open Technology Fund, but these programs have run into recent budget constraints. In Iran’s case, civilians have since turned to informal markets to purchase insecure VPNs or pay for the regime’s heavily filtered “Internet Pro” — a tiered internet service reserved for select groups.

Like VPNs, Starlink and other unauthorized satellite internet services are vulnerable to governments’ detection and jamming technology. Additionally, Starlink requires large terminals that can be challenging to smuggle and conceal from authorities. Notably, between March and July 2026, Iranian police say they confiscated 997 Starlink devices and detained 163 people linked with the equipment.

While conventional satellite broadband has its physical limitations, direct-to-cell (D2C) could one day provide another potential outlet for civilians to communicate during a terrestrial nationwide internet and cellular blackout. D2C offers the ability to directly connect to a satellite, bypassing the need for a traditional dish. Several tech companies are working to refine and expand D2C capabilities by enhancing communication and web browsing abilities while ensuring D2C is compatible with various smartphone models. However, the availability, speed and reliability of these capabilities vary across providers and are still in development — making uniform implementation in other countries difficult due to technical and regulatory challenges, as well as their government’s prohibition of unauthorized communication outlets.

With Tehran and other regimes wielding the power to cut off their citizens’ internet access and communications, the United States should work with the private sector to organize a campaign aimed at enabling civilians in authoritarian countries to circumvent everyday restrictions and any potential future shutdowns.

Since VPNs are only effective for bypassing internet restrictions and cannot operate during a full terrestrial shutdown, the US government needs to divert resources to solving this communications crisis in the longer term. As Starlink remains one of the only forms of communication during a blackout, the US should funnel Starlink terminals to civilians in need via activist organizations trained in smuggling humanitarian goods into conflict zones.

Simultaneously, the US government should work with SpaceX to co-develop smaller Starlink terminals that are easier to smuggle and assemble as part of its Starshield program, ultimately reducing the risk of drawing attention from authorities in countries where owning this technology is criminalized.

Additionally, Congress should direct the appropriate departments or agencies to work with companies offering D2C to accelerate development, as well as refine and expand their capabilities to include reliable cellular communication, web browsing and live streaming services. Once testing is complete and the products are secure for public distribution, the State Department should collaborate with humanitarian organizations to distribute D2C-compatible phones to civilians in need. Meanwhile, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control should quickly issue distributors the proper licenses to transport products to these countries as sanctions for their governments’ malign activities and oppression often prohibit American organizations from trading with them.

As authoritarian governments increasingly weaponize the internet and civilian communication to repress dissent, an information warfare tool set would enhance the livelihoods of those living in restrictive countries, improving their abilities to resist their regime’s repression through secure communication and freer internet access.