That single Trump administration decision sets in motion a geopolitical cluster. There’s confusion and jealousy among Gulf states; questions of burden-sharing among NATO allies amid Trump’s push for them to spend more money; and a political meltdown in Israel, among other drama.

…

“This deal with Qatar basically shows that checkbook diplomacy can be more successful than doing the actual burden-sharing that we officially ask — and even demand — of our allies,” Jonathan Ruhe at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America told Axios.

“We’re putting our necks on the line much more than Qatar is.”…

Read the full piece in Axios.

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Washington, DC – Any forthcoming ceasefire deal between Israel and Hamas must set the stage for a long-term solution to secure the Philadelphi Corridor—the zone along the Gaza-Egypt border—argues a new report released today by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America and co-authored by Israel Defense Forces Brigadier General (BG) Effie Defrin, currently a visiting fellow at JINSA.

The report, Holding the Line: A Strategy for Securing the Philadelphi Corridor, analyzes the pivotal diplomatic role the United States will need to play in ensuring Egypt agrees to secure its border with the Gaza Strip. It also reveals never publicly revealed details about Egypt’s security establishment and proposes key principles for U.S. negotiators and policymakers to craft a solution that secures Egyptians, Israelis, and Palestinians alike and averts the prospect of Hamas’s resurgence.

“For years, Egypt has had difficulty navigating internal tensions and interests in its approach to Hamas’s rule in Gaza: working with Israel benefits its internal security and stability, but it’s not communicated because any mention of cooperation or normalization is strongly opposed in public opinion,” said BG Defrin. “Intentional or not, this contradictory policy has facilitated Hamas’s military buildup via smuggling, both above and below ground, crossing through the Philadelphi Corridor.”

The report argues that any agreement must, at a minimum, include new physical barriers both above and below ground along the corridor, an array of sensors, cameras, radars and other advanced technology spanning the border, and a robust inspection regime at the border’s checkpoint overseen by a third party. Crucially, all measures must be backstopped by direct U.S. involvement, utilizing any and all policy levers, including U.S. foreign aid, to ensure Egyptian compliance.

“General Defrin has spent years working with regional partners and has personally witnessed Egypt’s internal discord between its various agencies, both military and general intelligence (GIS), regarding the Hamas issue,” said Blaise Misztal, JINSA Vice President for Policy. “This is why strong U.S. diplomacy is so important for securing Egypt’s full compliance in any agreement regarding the security of the Philadelphi Corridor.”

Read the Report

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The report makes the case that given Iran’s unprecedented but fleeting vulnerability after losing crucial ballistic missile and proxy forces, Trump should join Israel in giving Iran a clear ultimatum right away: agree fully and promptly to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program, or see it destroyed immediately.

“From day one of his second term, President-elect Trump must prepare credible military options to keep Iran short of the nuclear threshold, including supporting Israel’s freedom of action and readiness,” said Ambassador Eric Edelman, co-chair of JINSA’s Iran Policy Project. “Trump must use this pressure as negotiating leverage if he ultimately pursues nuclear talks with Iran.”

Should Trump decide instead to engage in talks, the report advises that he actively counter Iran’s nuclear advances and its plans to use them as leverage to secure sanctions relief, delegitimize U.S.-Israeli military action, and run out the clock on “snapback” of strict UN sanctions. Trump should avoid past U.S. mistakes by maintaining maximum pressure, demanding Iran finally show good faith by freezing enrichment, complying with inspectors, and halting proxy attacks – and walking away if Iran balks at agreeing to an acceptable deal by clear and pressing deadlines.

“America’s failure to act decisively will embolden Iran and destabilize global security, with ripple effects extending to other geopolitical hotspots such as Ukraine, Taiwan, and the Korean Peninsula,” said Gen. Charles Wald, USAF (ret.), co-chair of JINSA’s Iran Policy Project.

If Iran achieves a nuclear weapons capability, it would undermine decades of U.S. foreign policy, and jeopardize international non-proliferation efforts. To prevent this outcome, the report’s comprehensive strategy includes five key areas:

1. Economic pressure will take time to fully impact Iran, so Trump should move quickly to:
• Warn that anyone aiding Iran’s economy will face sanctions the day he takes office;
• Fully enforce existing U.S. sanctions on Iran’s vital oil export revenues, and blunt Iran’s use of oil as a weapon by boosting U.S. production and refilling U.S. reserves.

2. Isolating Iran diplomatically is crucial for coercing it to negotiate earnestly, including by:
• Working with Europe on UN snapback, well before this option expires in October;
• Persuading the EU to designate the Revolutionary Guard (IRGC) as a terrorist group;

3. Optimizing U.S. military readiness to deter Iranian retaliation and nuclear progress, by:
• Explicitly pledging America’s willingness to strike the regime’s top assets militarily;
• Updating contingency plans to neutralize Iran’s nuclear and other military facilities;
• Deploying U.S. capabilities to the region that can best threaten Iran’s nuclear sites.

4. Coordinating with Israel as the readiest and most credible threat to Iran, including by:
• Declaring Israeli military action to be consistent with stated U.S. prevention policy;
• Expediting transfers of KC-46 tankers, precision guided munitions, and air defenses;
• Conducting combined exercises to boost U.S.-Israel readiness and interoperability, and leaving KC-46 tankers or other key capabilities in Israel, as in past exercises.

5. Supporting the Iranian people, which is important in its own right and can also force the regime to pivot focus from its nuclear program to worrying about internal vulnerabilities.

The window for action is rapidly closing. By early 2025, critical international sanctions mechanisms may expire, allowing Iran to accelerate its nuclear ambitions unimpeded. Only through credible deterrence and a unified international stance can America hope to achieve a peaceful resolution.
Read the Report
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The following is a statement from Dr. Michael Makovsky, President and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, on the U.S.-brokered ceasefire deal in Lebanon:

“A ceasefire in Lebanon is welcome, reflecting Israel’s significant military gains against Hezbollah these past two months, and, if it holds, offers much promise for Israel and Lebanon.

“However, it doesn’t mark the end of the regional conflict between Israel and the Iranian axis, but merely a pause that Israel must use to replenish its weapons stocks to prepare for the next phase of the war.

“The Biden administration, as we’ve argued, has tied Israel’s hands by delaying or blocking delivery of numerous weapons systems—despite U.S. officials’ denials of arms slow-walking—which had the counter-productive result of dragging out Israel-Hezbollah fighting this fall. This administration needs to unblock and accelerate delivery of weapons to ensure Israel has everything it needs to win the war against Iran, which includes destroying the latter’s nuclear facilities.”

View JINSA’s U.S.-Israel Arms Transfer Infographic

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Washington, DC – The following is a statement from Michael Makovsky, President and CEO of the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, on the International Criminal Court issuing arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza:

“The ICC’s arrest warrants against Israel’s Prime Minister and former Defense Minister are a dangerous and illegal sham that punishes law-abiding officials defending Israel against an onslaught of terrorists who follow no law whatsoever.

“These arrest warrants are illegal under the Rome Statute, the international treaty that set up the ICC.

“Americans will likely be the next targets of this rogue court unless firm action is taken. The Biden administration must immediately sanction the leaders of the ICC and work to dismantle it.”

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Washington, DC – Any ceasefire deal with Israel and Hezbollah that fails to enshrine Israel’s freedom of action will only inflame and prolong hostilities, argues a new report released today by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, co-authored by Israel Defense Forces Brigadier General Effie Defrin, currently a visiting fellow at JINSA.

The report, Suppressing Iran’s Ring of Fire in Lebanon, analyzes the leaked details from recent ceasefire negotiations led by the United States, saying it does not go far enough in addressing the resolution’s lack of enforcement and narrow focus on southern Lebanon.

The United States has an invaluable role to play, alongside Israel, in restoring calm to Israel’s north and paving the way for a more secure future for the people of Lebanon and Israel alike—including helping massively overhaul the UN peacekeeping force in Lebanon, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); instituting wide-ranging reforms to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF); and enforcing a deal’s provisions with sustained attention and a willingness to use tough measures.

“As head of the IDF’s International Cooperation Division, I saw firsthand Hezbollah’s gargantuan military build-up occurring under the nose of UNIFIL and the LAF.” said BG Defrin. “Now, the time and conditions are ripe for the United States to pressure Hezbollah into a ceasefire that avoids past mistakes, while ensuring Israel’s freedom of action and ultimately dealing a major blow to Iran’s regionwide terror network.”

The report is replete with examples, drawn from BG Defrin’s five years overseeing the IDF’s international division, of how UN Security Resolution 1701 completely failed to prevent Hezbollah from rapidly expanding its arsenal and building an extensive military tunnel network throughout the supposed buffer zone with Israel in southern Lebanon.

“BG Defrin’s insights from years of engaging with the Hezbollah challenge make clear that Israel, the United States, and the free world cannot afford a return to the rudderless diplomatic misadventures of years past,” said Michael Makovsky, PhD, President & CEO of JINSA. “There is no substitute for U.S. leadership to help ink and enforce a strong deal that meets Israel’s security needs and continues Israel’s momentum against the region’s Iran-backed terror proxies.”

The report recommends that any ceasefire deal, and its enforcement, must involve six elements:

1) Support for Israel’s Freedom of Action

Any ceasefire deal must explicitly and unambiguously convey Israel’s freedom of action, whenever, wherever in Lebanon. Israel must be able to act freely to neutralize threats and interdict inbound weapons. Part of the deal’s success will hinge on consistent U.S. rhetorical backing of Israel’s continued legitimate right to self-defense against Hezbollah threats. 

2) An Overhaul of UNIFIL

Due to UNIFIL’s inability to restrain Hezbollah, a new, U.S.-led effort is needed to reform the peacekeeping force through substantial reforms to UNIFIL’s mandate—including reforming its reporting and aversion to enforcement on “private property”—in the lead-up to its next renewal in August 2025. To push through these changes, the United States should exercise leverage over whichever country holds UNIFIL’s rotating chair and threatening to withhold some portion of U.S. funding to the United Nations.

3) Enhanced Dialogue Channels

The United States should reform the long-rudderless and opaque tripartite mechanism (Israel, Lebanon, and UNIFIL) by pressuring UNIFIL and Lebanon to adopt fixed protocols for regular meetings and require snap meetings on an ad hoc basis. Future tripartite meetings should include outside state observers—including the United States—and published directives to bring accountability to the institutionally risk-averse and inertia-driven LAF and UNIFIL.

4) U.S.-led Reforms to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)

It is highly unrealistic to expect that the LAF will whip into shape absent external—namely U.S.—pressures to reform. A set portion of future U.S. military aid to Lebanon should be conditioned on the LAF terminating any Hezbollah cooperation, facilitating UNIFIL entry into private property, hermetically sealing Lebanon from Iranian arms, and diversifying its geographic and sectarian recruitment to hedge against Hezbollah infiltration.

5) A Robust Oversight Team

Sustained, engaged, and tough U.S. leadership will be required to prevent any international mechanism from devolving into an ineffective bureaucratic layer that replicates UNIFIL’s inefficiency. This should involve regular U.S.-led briefings with the relevant parties—namely Israel, Lebanon, and UNIFIL. The United States should also stand up a joint operations center to oversee LAF and UNIFIL operations and provide operational insights, including by installing cameras and sensors on UNIFIL and LAF personnel and facilities.

6) Continued Efforts to Change Iran’s Strategic Calculus

The United States must work in parallel with Israel to communicate unequivocally to Iran that it will face dire consequences for trying to undermine or sabotage a ceasefire deal and make good on its word.

Read the Report

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In a full-blown war with Iran, these existing bases will be rendered unusable by sustained Iranian attack. The Iranians can see this and have created a large and very capable missile and drone force in part to exploit this situation.

Therefore, we need to reexamine where we are based in the region, both on a day-to-day and contingency basis.

Our presence at existing bases provides an important assurance mission to host countries. Thus, we are unlikely to permanently leave bases like Al Dhafra in the United Arab Emirates and Al Udeid in Qatar.

We should, however, work with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman and Egypt to identify bases as far to the west as possible where we can deploy aircraft, maintenance capabilities, refueling capabilities and weapons.

We have already done some of this work. The “Western Basing Network” was a joint U.S.-Saudi decision to evaluate bases near the Red Sea for use in times of war. Not as far advanced but still under consideration were basing concepts that included Oman, Egypt and Jordan. The U.S. Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid has also shifted some of its responsibilities to locations in the United States, significantly reducing air command and control vulnerabilities.

How does this approach, known as “agile combat employment,” work? Based on warnings and indications of war, land-based air assets would relocate to the western bases from their locations along the Arabian Gulf. The number of Iranian weapons that could reach them would be significantly reduced, warning times would be increased and the Iranians would have a targeting problem in ascertaining from which bases U.S. aircraft operated.

In the event of hostilities, these aircraft would launch from the distant bases, be refueled en route and conduct combat operations over Iran. Depending on how the fight was going, they could land and refuel/rearm at the existing forward bases on the Arabian Gulf, minimizing their time on the ground, and increasing their “cycle rate.” Regardless, they would return to the western bases to “bed down.”

However, access to these installations is not guaranteed. The necessary political decisions are not necessarily made quickly in this region. The facilities themselves range from “bare bones” bases to fully equipped ones. Nonetheless, this is something that is squarely in the best interest of all concerned.

There is a second component to this new basing construct, and it is the opportunity made possible by Israel’s 2021 entry into the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). It is now possible to consider basing in Israel in the event of a war with Iran. It has the same geographic advantages as basing in western Saudi Arabia or other Arab states. Additionally, Israel has a powerful, proven air and missile defense capability. The fact that Israel is now in CENTCOM also facilitates training, interoperability, and even maintenance. Israel should certainly be at the forefront of possible basing alternatives.

The third component to the basing solution also involves Israel, and it is the growing normalization of ties with Arab states. This was made diplomatically possible by the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020. It was made operationally feasible by Israel’s move into the CENTCOM AOR. It was further underwritten by Iranian malign behavior which has finally convinced the Gulf States that a collective approach to air and missile defense is necessary, practicable and achievable without sacrificing sovereignty. It is largely a matter of sharing tactics, techniques, and procedures and agreeing what sensor information to share, and how to share it, with the U.S. acting as the honest broker.

We have a clear-cut example of this concept at work. The Iranians’ large, complex attack against Nevatim Airfield in Israel on April 13, 2024, failed because of Israeli competence, U.S. and allied assistance and the cooperation and assistance of Arab neighbors. Information was shared; airspace was shared. In every measurable way, this was a remarkable success story.

Deterrence must be continuous; in the Middle East, it can have a very short half-life unless it is refreshed systematically. The events of the past two months clearly show that Iran can be deterred from undertaking irresponsible and deadly attacks in the region, but this requires resources, careful messaging and the demonstrated ability to fight and win if necessary.

We now need to move aggressively to develop basing alternatives that demonstrate that we are prepared to fight and prevail in a sustained, high-intensity war with Iran. Geography is destiny for some, but not for all. Being obviously ready to rebase rapidly, and frequently exercising the capability, will increase the chances of peace in the region, because Iran will be watching.

Gen McKenzie, a retired U.S. Marine general, served as commander of U.S. Central Command from 2019 to 2022. He is the Hertog Distinguished Fellow at the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) and author of “The Melting Point: High Command and War in the 21st Century.”

Originally published in Military Times.

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Washington, DC – There is a real risk that an Iranian air and missile attack could overwhelm U.S. military bases along the Arabian Gulf, according to a new report by the former commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) that the Jewish Institute for National Security of America released today. This vulnerability detracts from America’s ability to deter Iranian aggression and fight them effectively in a high-intensity scenario.

JINSA Hertog Distinguished Fellow General Kenneth “Frank” McKenzie, USMC (ret.), writes in the report, U.S. Basing in the Middle East: Overcoming the Tyranny of Geography, that in a war with Iran, the United States will not be able to maintain these air bases in a full-throated conflict, because they will be rendered unusable by sustained Iranian attack. Correcting this will require a comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military regional basing strategy.

“Our basing strategy is outdated and poorly positioned to meet the central threat in the region: Iran,” said McKenzie. “By developing a flexible western basing network for America’s air assets, we will complicate Iran’s ability to target our forces and raise the cost of aggression.”

While the current basing network effectively met the challenges of past eras, they are poorly positioned for the fight that is likely to emerge, and it is incumbent upon America’s leaders to begin developing a contingency basing structure now.

“General McKenzie brings unparalleled knowledge to rethinking and updating how and where we base U.S. forces to meet America’s strategic challenge in the Mideast, especially in effectively deterring Iranian aggression,” said Michael Makovsky, President and CEO of JINSA. “I hope and expect U.S. policymakers will heed his concerns about the vulnerability of U.S. forces based in Qatar and elsewhere near Iran, and follow his recommendations to base more U.S. forces in western Saudi Arabia and possibly Israel, among other novel conclusions.”

To update U.S. regional strategy to counter the current regional threats and demonstrate a credible will and capability to fight and win if needed, the report makes the following recommendations:

• Re-examine where U.S. military assets are based in the region, both on a day-to-day basis and on a contingency basis.
• Work with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, and Egypt to identify bases as far to the west as possible where it can deploy aircraft, maintenance capabilities, refueling capabilities, and weapons.
• Relocate land-based air defenses, based on warning and indications of war, from their current locations along the Arabian Gulf to bases further west.
• Further capitalize on Israel’s 2021 shift from the European Command’s Area of Responsibility (AOR) to CENTCOM’s AOR by examining Israel’s potential role in alternative basing structures.
• Continue to enhance air and missile defense cooperation with friendly Arab states, including working to forge an understanding of what sensor information to share and how to share it.
• Devote the necessary resources and craft messaging to deter Iran and its proxies from continuing to undertake deadly attacks across the region.
• Adopt a posture that allows the United States to rebase rapidly and frequently based on regional developments.

Being ready to rebase rapidly and frequently exercising the capability will increase the chances of peace in the region, because Iran will be watching.

Read the Report

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Congressman Brad Schneider (D-IL) joined JINSA to discuss Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s historic address to Congress and its impact on U.S. support for Israel in Congress, efforts to confront Iran’s so-called “Axis of Resistance,” and prospects for Israel-Saudi normalization, informed by the congressman’s recent trip to Saudi Arabia. The discussion was moderated by JINSA’s President and CEO Michael Makovsky, PhD.

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