The U.S.-Israel Security Policy Project examines the various ways to strengthen the U.S.-Israel security relationship amid dramatic regional changes to meet growing dangers and capitalize on new opportunities.
Learn MoreJINSA’s Abraham Accords Policy Project examines the historic implications of Israeli-Arab normalization for U.S. and Middle East security and provides policy recommendations for American decision-makers to expand and deepen these agreements, particularly in terms of enhanced regional defense cooperation.
Read MoreThe Gemunder Center’s revamped Iran Policy Project brings together former senior military officers, high-ranking government officials, energy experts and business leaders to address the pressing challenges to U.S. national security posed by Iran and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program.
Learn MoreThe Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project was established by JINSA to examine evolving threats and opportunities, and to provide recommendations, for U.S. policy toward the region, including Turkey’s increasingly aggressive posture, the return of great power competition and significant energy discoveries.
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The strategy that Hamas employed in the 2014 Gaza War represents the new face of war that threatens to undermine the effectiveness of conventional militaries, endangers civilians in irregular conflicts, and distorts the international legal structure.The Gaza Assessment Policy Project closely studies the evolution of this strategy and Israel’s response, based on primary source research and discussions with senior Israeli, Palestinian, and United Nations (U.N.) officials.
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The Hybrid Warfare Policy Project was established by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy to define the requirements of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and to evaluate the performance of the U.S., Israeli, and other allied militaries in compliance with – and sometimes, beyond – the dictates of that law. The Policy Project also seeks to focus attention on the conduct of hybrid adversaries such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic State, which often intentionally exploit that same body of law to stymie U.S., Israeli,and allied forces in battle and to discredit their self-defense operations in the forum of public opinion.
Learn MoreJINSA’s Jordan Valley Policy Project examines the strategic importance of Israeli sovereignty in the Jordan Valley for Israel’s self-defense, U.S. national security interests and stability in the Middle East.
Learn MoreJINSA’s Israel-China Policy Project examines ways that the United States and Israel can cooperate to address the growing geopolitical and economic challenges from China.
Read MoreJINSA’s Gemunder Center EMP Policy Project convenes former high-ranking government and military officials, directors of national laboratories, nuclear engineers and other experts to raise awareness and develop actionable recommendations to enhance U.S. strategic deterrence, critical infrastructure and societal resiliency against the spectrum of electromagnetic threats.
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National Security Briefs
- National Security Briefs
Iranian Terrorism Concerns Surround New Biden Immigration Regulation
A new Biden administration immigration regulation, purportedly designed to aid processing of visas for U.S.-friendly Afghan nationals, contains concerning loopholes that could seriously weaken immigration restrictions against members and supporters of terrorist organizations. Simultaneous with the re-opening of negotiations with Iran this week, the regulation also seems to reduce visa restrictions on many conscripts from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a move that might appear as a partial concession to Iran’s demand to lift the IRGC’s terrorist designation. If this regulation is truly intended only for the restricted case of Afghanistan, the administration should quickly amend this regulation to remove the troubling l...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 6/27
Visit our Iran Status Page Sixteen weeks after being officially paused, nuclear deal negotiations between the United States and Iran are expected to pick back up in Qatar on Tuesday, June 28. The resumption of talks follows European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell’s visit to Tehran over the weekend, despite no outstanding issues being resolved during his trip. Iran is still demanding the removal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation as well as political guarantees that future U.S. administrations will abide by any deal. Borrell stated that “the US and Iran will talk – not directly – with a facilitation by me and my team as coordinator.” ...
U.S. Leadership Needed on East Med Energy
Last week’s EU-Israel-Egypt natural gas agreement shows how the Eastern Mediterranean offers valuable opportunities to help reduce the dependence of America’s European allies on Russian energy. However, the peaceful development and transportation of these resources by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and Israel also faces growing challenges from Turkey, Hezbollah and potentially others. To fully realize the region’s potential to advance Europe’s energy security in the face of Moscow’s aggression, the United States must reverse its hands-off approach and support its partners’ proactive heavy lifting to bring Eastern Mediterranean energy online – including by appointing a Special Envoy for the region and backing the expansion of natural ga...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 6/9
Visit our Iran Status Page On June 8 as the Board of Governors (BoG) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) passed a resolution led by France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States calling on Iran to “urgently cooperate with the IAEA’s probe into undeclared nuclear material in Iran.” For years, Iran has blocked efforts by IAEA inspectors to clarify Tehran’s past work on a nuclear weapon, including by denying access to suspected undeclared nuclear facilities. Iran’s non-compliance with a three-month roadmap it agreed on with the IAEA in March to resolve these concerns led to the BoG’s decision to pass the resolution at its June meeting. The June 8 resolution “expresse[d] profound concern...
After Greek Seizure of Iranian Tanker, Iran Escalates
Iran detained two Greek-flagged tankers on May 27 in response to Greece’s seizure, announced a day earlier and carried out at the behest of the United States, of an Iranian-flagged vessel carrying Iranian oil to Turkey. The almost routine Iranian escalation comes straight from its counter-pressure playbook designed to deter both U.S. pressure and sanctions enforcement in a bid to continue reaping the benefits of the current open-ended but dead-end nuclear negotiations. More curious is the case of the Iranian oil-laden tanker seized by Greece. Strangely, it remains uncertain if it was detained due to its attempts to circumvent sanctions on Iranian oil exports or because of the ships seeming ties to sanctioned Russian entities. Yet, th...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 6/2
Visit our Iran Status Page Nuclear deal negotiations between the United States and Iran remain officially paused as Iran appears to shift its key demands, having accepted that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) will remain listed as a terrorist organization. Tehran has reverted to highlighting a previous demand: any agreement must be binding for future U.S. presidential administrations. Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian again stressed concerns about the absence of a guarantee that future administrations would obey a deal. Iran has insisted that the White House commit future administrations to follow a nuclear deal, however the U.S. is unable to make this guarantee – something it has repeatedly communi...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 5/27
Visit our Iran Status Page The JINSA Iran Policy Project, co-chaired by Amb. Eric Edelman and Gen. Chuck Wald (Ret.), released a new report, “Time for Plan B on Iran,” detailing why the administration needs to acknowledge that its attempts to return to the JCPOA have failed and how to implement a plan B. Though Iran nuclear deal negotiations have been stalled for weeks over Iran’s demand that the U.S. lift the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation, President Biden has reportedly made a final decision not to give in to that demand. Iranian officials stated that the removal of the FTO designation is a prerequisite for the country’s return to the agreement. ...
Boosting Greece’s Roles as Vital Defense and Energy Ally
This week’s visit to Washington by Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis is a timely opportunity to deepen the bilateral defense partnership and strengthen Greece’s role as a vital NATO and energy hub in Europe, in light of both Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Turkey’s continued unreliability as an ally. The Biden administration should support projects to fast-track Greece becoming a reliable and critical EU energy distribution hub, and the Pentagon should enhance U.S. deployments through Greece in order to more effectively and rapidly project power into Eastern Europe and other nearby hotspots. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Jonathan Ruhe - Director of Foreign Policy Ari Cicurel - Seni...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 5/12
Visit our Iran Status Page Negotiations over a new Iran nuclear deal remain paused as the European Union’s lead negotiator, Enrique Mora, is in Tehran this week to meet with Iranian negotiator Ali Bagheri-Kani and seek a “middle way” to end the stalemate over Iran’s demand that its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) be removed from the U.S. State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. U.S. foreign policy chief Josep Borrell described the diplomatic effort as “the last bullet.” Venting his frustration with the status of negotiations, Borrell added, “we cannot continue like this forever, because in the meantime Iran continues developing their nuclear program.” Axios reported that Biden a...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 5/6
Visit our Iran Status Page With negotiations over a new Iran nuclear deal stalemated due to Tehran’s demand that the United States remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from the State Department’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list, Reuters reported on May 2 that “Western officials have largely lost hope the Iran nuclear deal can be resurrected.” While the United States previously offered to lift the FTO designation in exchange for various commitments from Iran, including ending its pursuit of retribution for the 2020 killing of Gen. Qasem Soleimani, the more recent line from officials is that some form of “reciprocity” would be needed from Iran, though they have yet to officially rule out d...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 4/28
Talks remain paused as Iran continues to demand that the United States lift the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ (IRGC) Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation, though Iranian and European officials appear eager to resume negotiations. Recent comments from Iranian officials suggest a renewed urgency to resume talks in-person in Vienna. Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh called for a return to Vienna, saying on April 25, “it is appropriate that a face-to-face meeting is held as soon as possible,” and adding, “it is not yet decided where and when to have this meeting and at what level it should be held, but it is on the agenda.” Khatibzadeh also said, "prolonging the pause in the negotiations is no...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 4/25
Nuclear negotiations with Iran have been stalled since early March, with the final outstanding issue reportedly being Tehran’s demand that the United States lift its Foreign Terrorism Organization (FTO) designation against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Recent reports suggest that the Biden administration intends to reject Iran’s demand to lift the FTO designation on the IRGC. After a call between President Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett on April 24, Bennett said, “I am sure that President Biden … will not allow the IRGC to be removed from the list of terrorist organizations,” adding, “Israel has clarified its position on the issue: The IRGC is the largest terrorist organization in the wo...
U.S. Terrorism Sanctions Must Remain on Iran’s IRGC
Negotiations with Iran remain stalled, reportedly due to a single Iranian demand unrelated to the 2015 nuclear deal: that the United States remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from its Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) list. With mounting bipartisan opposition in Congress and concern among U.S. allies in Israel and the Sunni Arab world, the Biden administration is reportedly reconsidering lifting the designation or perhaps maintaining just part of the IRGC on the FTO list. It is critical that the entire IRGC, not just part of it, retain its FTO designation since it continues to meet the U.S. legal criteria for a terrorist organization. Regardless of whether the IRGC is delisted, the emerging deal is dangerously short ...
Infographic: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Remains a Foreign Terrorist Organization
The Biden administration is reportedly considering removing Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) from the U.S. list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) as part of a new nuclear deal. However, the IRGC remains a terrorist organization and does not meet the criteria for removal from the FTO list under U.S. law.
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 4/12
The Washington Post reported on Friday that the United States plans to reject the Iranian demand that the United States lift its designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in order to renew the 2015 nuclear agreement. Despite this report, which cited a senior Biden administration official, the administration has not officially ruled out lifting the FTO designation. On April 12, a reporter from The Wall Street Journal tweeted that the U.S. has ruled out lifting the FTO unconditionally and accepting the political cost, writing, “Iran needs to accept conditions for lifting of FTO or it’s not a price the administration at the top level is prepared to pay.” On April 6, Secr...
State Department Misleads on Iranian Aggression
Last week, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price made the misleading claim, based on limited and unclear data, that Iranian aggression is the result of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, implying that reaching a deal with Tehran will lead to de-escalation. A comprehensive analysis demonstrates Iranian aggression began well before JCPOA withdrawal and has increased most in the aftermath of the JCPOA agreement and again during the Biden administration’s open-ended negotiations. This data suggests the United States and its regional partners are likely to face a rise in Iranian aggression if there is a new nuclear agreement. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA St...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 4/5
Negotiation status: PAUSED State Department spokesman Ned Price was described on April 4 as saying, “the United States still believes there is an opportunity to overcome the remaining differences with Iran in talks over its nuclear program.” Also on April 4, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Saeed Khatibzadeh said, "America is responsible for the halt of these talks ... a deal is very much within reach.” Where are negotiators? Negotiators are currently in their home countries. Officials have not been in Vienna, the site of negotiations, since the eighth round of talks was suspended indefinitely on March 7. It has been roughly 5 months since the Biden administration first said that only weeks remained to se...
Expect More Iranian Aggression with New Nuclear Deal
Supporters of reentering the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) have wrongly attributed Iran’s malign regional activity to President Trump’s withdrawal from the agreement, implying there will be a de-escalation once a new nuclear agreement goes into effect. However, data collected by JINSA indicates the greatest increases in Iranian violence come during periods of diplomatic engagement. For the 3.5 years the JCPOA was in effect, Iran attacked the United States and its partners more than three times as often as it did preceding the deal. In the 14 months since President Biden took office seeking to reenter the deal, Iranian aggression has nearly doubled compared to the second half of President Trump’s term. If the Biden adm...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/29
No officials have returned to Vienna to resume talks on an Iran nuclear deal since leaving for their respective capitals in mid-March. There have been suggestions that negotiators may not need to return to Vienna to finalize an agreement. Though several European officials recently reiterated that a deal is just days away, United States officials’ tone remained more pessimistic. Speaking in Doha, Qatar, about a possible agreement, Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley said on Sunday he “can’t be confident it is imminent,” echoing State Department Spokesperson Ned Price’s comments from last week. The European Union foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, also in Doha on Sunday, sounded more optimistic, repeating West...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/24
Statements from U.S. officials about the prospects for a new nuclear deal have become more pessimistic in recent days, while the Biden administration faces growing pressure not to lift terrorism sanctions against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Axios confirmed that the lead U.S. negotiator, Special Envoy for Iran Robert Malley, recently offered to lift the IRGC’s Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation in exchange for a public commitment to de-escalate malign activities in the region, which Iran declined. Lifting the FTO designation is reportedly the final hurdle to an agreement, but Iran has every incentive to keep dragging out talks while its nuclear programs advances. The FTO designation and its r...
A “Disgusting” Lack of Transparency on New Iran Nuclear Deal
With a new Iran nuclear deal potentially just days away, bipartisan concerns remain in Congress about the reported concessions being offered to Iran and the Biden administration’s highly concerning lack of transparency about negotiations. President Biden should submit any agreement to Congress, as required by U.S. law, and also refuse to lift terrorism sanctions on Iran unrelated to its nuclear program. Congress should urgently convene long overdue public hearings on the administration’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear program and malign behaviors more generally. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. Click here to download the infographic. JINSA Staff Contributors Jonathan Ruhe - Director of Foreign Policy Andrew ...
Houthi Attacks Show Need for Stronger U.S.-Saudi Defense Cooperation
As part of their steadily escalating aggression against Saudi Arabia, over the weekend Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen launched one of their most impactful missile and drone attack in months against vital energy, water, and power facilities in the kingdom. While reports indicate the Biden administration recently rushed additional air defenses to protect Saudi Arabia, critical targets across the country remain vulnerable to Houthi attacks, and U.S.-Saudi relations remain strained to the detriment of both countries and regional security. The Biden administration should prioritize strengthening America’s diplomatic coordination and dialogue with its Arab Gulf partners and bolster security cooperation against shared Iran-backed threats, espe...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/16
A new nuclear agreement with Iran once again looks imminent in the wake of three key developments in the last 24 hours: Russia said it’s received the guarantees it asked for and is ready to agree to a deal; The United States is reportedly considering lifting the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); and Iran released two British hostages in exchange for more than $500 million. Iranian Foreign Minister (FM) Amir-Abdollahian said, “2 of 4 remaining issues (Iran’s red lines) in Vienna Talks have been resolved, but 2 issues including economic guarantees are still unresolved. If US is ready to settle these two, we’re ready to convene ministerial gatherin...
U.S. Must Support East Med Energy Security
The Biden administration’s abrupt decision in January to withdraw support for the EastMed Pipeline, which would deliver Israeli and Cypriot natural gas to Europe via Greece upon completion in 2025, has been proven misguided by momentous events following Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. With the Eastern Mediterranean’s abundant offshore energy resources becoming increasingly important economically and geopolitically as America’s European allies work to lessen their hydrocarbon dependence on Russia, the administration should reverse its January decision, commit itself to studying the most effective means to transport Eastern Mediterranean energy to Europe, and make clear its support for the region’s peaceful energy development m...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/15
Nuclear negotiations with Iran have been on hold since Friday, when EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell tweeted “a pause in #ViennaTalks is needed.” The pause stems from Russia’s sudden demands last week – for guarantees that its trade with Iran will be exempt from U.S. sanctions related to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine – but the added delays also buy more time for Iran to continue advancing its nuclear program. The U.S. State Department has said it would not agree to Russia’s demands, with Secretary Blinken calling Russia’s demands “irrelevant” and “not in any way linked together” with the JCPOA nuclear agreement. Despite Iran’s and Russia’s demands, both countries argue the United States re...
As Nuclear Talks Pause, Iran Escalates
On March 13, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC) fired twelve ballistic missiles from Iranian territory targeting the U.S. consulate site in Erbil, Iraq, marking a major escalation of its already intense pressure campaign against the United States and its Middle Eastern partners. Tehran seeks to test the Biden administration recently announced “indefinite pause” in nuclear negotiations, to push it to return to the table and make further, dangerous concessions, and to exert pressure on Israel to stop its “campaign between the wars” against Iranian regional aggression. Having seen the Biden administration’s extremely limited and indirect response to past attacks on U.S. forces, Iran clearly believes that the United Sta...
U.S. Tensions with Saudi Arabia and UAE
Tuesday’s report that leaders of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) declined to speak with President Biden about increasing their oil output reflects a clear perception by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that their vital security concerns are being ignored by Washington, as it negotiates a dangerous new nuclear deal with Iran and failed to provide proper assistance during a sustained escalation in attacks by Iran and its proxies. Despite these differences, the United States and the two Gulf countries still stand to gain more from cooperation than from cold shoulders. The United States should first reassure its partners by rejecting a bad nuclear deal with Iran, redesignating the Houthis as a terrorist organization, promoting collecti...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/11
Negotiations over a new Iran nuclear deal hit a road block this week as outstanding Iranian demands plus last-minute demands from Russia led to a “break” in talks. On Friday morning, European Union foreign policy chief Josep Borrell announced the break. Borrell: “A pause in #ViennaTalks is needed, due to external factors. A final text is essentially ready and on the table … As coordinator, I will, with my team, continue to be in touch with all #JCPOA participants and the U.S. to overcome the current situation and to close the agreement.” Iranian Foreign Minister Saeed Khatibzadeh denied external factors were derailing the process, writing, “Successful conclusion of talks will be the main focus of all … No external...
Infographic: Never-Ending Iran Deadlines (Updated)
JINSA’s updated infographic details the numerous continued warnings from U.S. and European officials that time is running out to revive the JCPOA agreement. These repeated, unfulfilled warnings merely encourage Tehran to further drag out negotiations, advance its nuclear weapons program and extract more U.S. concessions.
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/7
Despite parties to the JCPOA talks in Vienna expressing strong hope that a return to the deal could be secured over the weekend, Russia potentially threw a wrench in the talks by demanding guarantees to protect its cooperation with Iran against Ukraine-related sanctions. In parallel, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi traveled to Tehran where he claimed to reach an agreement for a three-month plan to resolve Iran’s obstruction of inspectors at suspected undeclared nuclear sites. In a lengthy interview with Iranian media over the weekend, Russian Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov emphasized Iran’s accomplishments throughout the negotiations, saying, “realistically speaking, Iran got more than frankly I expected, ...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/3
The 8th round of Iran nuclear negotiations remains ongoing as new details emerge regarding the expected end-date for talks as well as Iran’s nuclear developments over the last several months. Officials’ comments continue to suggest that a deal will be reached within the next few days, although that now largely depends on International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi’s trip to Tehran this weekend. European Union coordinator for the negotiations Enrique Mora tweeted, “We are at the final stages of the Vienna Talks on JCPOA. Some relevant issues are still open and success is never guaranteed in such a complex negotiation. Doing our best in the coordinator's team. But we are definitely not there yet.” Iran F...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/2
The 8th and supposedly final round of Iranian nuclear talks continued on Wednesday, March 2, in Vienna. Reports suggest that little has changed over the last few days of negotiations, as the three major sticking points in the negotiation from Monday – safeguards, the scope of sanctions, and economic guarantees – remain outstanding. Former U.S. State Department official Gabriel Noronha released what his sources claim are details of the extensive sanctions relief – far beyond what is required under the initial JCPOA agreement – that the Biden administration has offered Tehran for rejoining the nuclear deal. The new deal will allegedly exceed the JCPOA by granting sanctions relief to key political and economic pillars of the regi...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 3/1
The 8th and supposedly final round of Iranian nuclear deal talks continued on Tuesday, March 1, in Vienna, as several key issues remain unsolved. Upon the conclusion of Monday’s meetings between Iranian chief negotiator Ali Bagheri-Kani and the P4+1 yesterday, officials from sides involved in the talks publicly noted the increasing urgency to wrap up negotiations: “It is now or never. If they cannot reach a deal this week, the talks will collapse forever,” said an Iranian diplomat in Tehran. Russian Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov: “completion [of talks] will fall on the beginning of March, very soon.” Ulyanov tweeted photos of the Monday evening meeting, saying, “Tremendous progress has been made since April 2021, wh...
Iran Nuclear Talks Update 2/28
On Monday, February 28, Ali Bagheri-Kani, Iran’s chief negotiator, returned to Vienna and resumed negotiations, after having left for Tehran on Thursday for consultations. U.S. and Western government officials are signaling this may be the last week to negotiate a return to the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Although similar statements have been made previously, these are much more specific – albeit so far only attributed to anonymous sources, not made publicly by high-ranking officials. Over the weekend, Western diplomatic sources warned if “within the next few days [the] remaining issues are not resolved, the JCPOA will definitely be dead and it will be impossible to revive it.” On Monday, a senior unn...
Iran’s Short Breakout Time Under JCPOA 2.0
With the United States and Iran closing in on a return to the JCPOA nuclear agreement, the revived deal will likely fail to restore what its Obama-era predecessors claimed as the JCPOA’s primary benefit – putting Iran at least a year away from being able to enrich a bomb’s worth of fissile material. Indeed, if the restored deal keeps the same terms as the original by permitting Tehran to store its advanced centrifuges, we estimate breakout time would be 4.8-6.5 months until early 2026, at which point the JCPOA permits Iran to steadily shrink these timeframes further. Unless the Biden administration insists Iran ship out or destroy its advanced centrifuges, any new deal will delay Iran’s nuclear program only half as much for half as ...
The Urgency of Now: The Administration and Congress on Time Running Out For Iran Deal
With the Biden administration warning that time is running out for the United States to rejoin the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear agreement with Iran, Congress is becoming anxious about the status of ongoing negotiations and demanding oversight of any deal that comes out of Vienna. On February 1, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Bob Menendez announced his growing concerns on the Senate floor; on February 8, thirty-two Senate Republicans sent a letter to the president demanding he send any deal to Congress for approval – as required by law. Under pressure from both chambers, the White House’s lead Iran negotiator Rob Malley briefed the House and Senate foreign relations committees on February 8 and 9, respe...
Iran’s Unprecedented Wave of Attacks Against the UAE
Iranian-backed militias have expanded their regional aggression by launching an unprecedented wave of attacks against the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2022. The Houthis in Yemen and, most recently, a pro-Iran militia in Iraq have targeted the UAE this year with at least four ballistic missiles, six drones, and four cruise missiles, the first time these groups are known to have targeted the previously safe Emirates. While the combined efforts of Emirati and U.S.-operated air defenses intercepted multiple projectiles, several reached their targets, causing destruction and casualties. These strikes are part of a significant escalation of attacks by Iranian-backed groups since the beginning of 2021 that has continued this year. The Biden admin...
Time Never Seems to Run Out for Iran Negotiations
It has been seven months since the Biden administration has been warning Iran that time was running out for nuclear diplomacy. For nearly two months, U.S. and European officials have been claiming there are “weeks, not months” left to get to a deal. Yet, talks keep dragging on. In the absence of credible “Plan B” alternatives to further open-ended diplomacy with Iran, these repeated and unfulfilled warnings that time is running out – as detailed in JINSA’s infographic below – merely encourage Tehran to drag out talks, advance its nuclear weapons program and accrue more leverage to extract U.S. concessions. The United States should work urgently with Israel and others to develop viable military options that can deter or prev...
Iran’s Drone Offensive
Since the start of 2022, Iranian-backed militias have escalated their attacks, predominantly using drones, against U.S. service members and regional partners. On January 17, in a major expansion of the Yemeni conflict, the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels launched a combined ballistic and cruise missile and drone strike against the United Arab Emirates (UAE), killing three. Earlier in the month, Shia militias tied to Iran launched a spate of rocket and drone attacks surrounding the second anniversary of the U.S. strike that killed Iranian Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani. This wave of aggression spotlights the need for strong American leadership that leverages the Abraham Accords, as detailed in JINSA’s report, A Stronger and Wider Peace...
Setting a Deadline for U.S.-Iran Nuclear Talks
As the United States and Iran resume nuclear negotiations in Vienna, the Biden administration finds itself at even greater disadvantages than when previous talks broke off in June, given growing Iranian nuclear leverage, a new hardline president in Tehran and eroding U.S. credibility. With time currently on Iran’s side, the White House should issue a year-end deadline for Iran to rejoin the JCPOA, as well as commit to submitting any agreement to Congress for approval. Regardless of the outcome of talks, the United States urgently must build credible military alternatives to open-ended diplomacy, including by supporting Israel’s freedom of action. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal -...
U.S. & Israel “Plan B” for Iran
Iran is rapidly approaching the nuclear threshold, even as its officials recently announced they will return to stalled negotiations about reentering the JCPOA nuclear agreement by the end of November. Beyond diplomacy, the United States and Israel declared their readiness to explore “other options” for preventing a nuclear Iran, with Israel recently accelerating military operational preparations including increased funding, planning and exercising. In addition to developing its own credible threat of force, the United States should promptly take action to bolster Israel’s self-defense capabilities to gain additional diplomatic leverage against Iran. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Jonathan R...
Brazen Drone Strike Against Iraqi Prime Minister
In a brazen attack, three armed drones targeted the residence of Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi on November 7. The attack was likely launched by Iranian-backed Shia militias in the aftermath of a recent poor electoral performance for pro-Iranian Shia parties. Iranian-backed groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen have significantly escalated their attacks on U.S. service members, partners, and interests this year, particularly through drone strikes with little overt U.S. response. Deterring attacks in Iraq and throughout the Middle East requires a regionwide strategy that includes strong U.S. military force against perpetrators, cooperation with regional partners, and the deployment of a regional air defense architecture capable of thwart...
Turkey Prepares for Possible Offensive Against U.S. Partners in Syria
Turkey appears to be planning a new military incursion against five Kurdish-controlled areas in northeastern Syria. Turkey’s use of drones will likely be a crucial element in any new offensive. Since May 2021, Turkey has significantly escalated the frequency of its drone strikes against Kurdish targets in Syria and northern Iraq that it claims are members of terrorist organizations. However, Ankara’s growing aggression in northeast Syria against U.S.-partnered Kurdish forces undermines U.S. counterterrorism operations and regional stability as well as likely helping Assad and Russia consolidate their power in the area. The Biden administration should respond by asserting greater command over U.S.-controlled airspace and publicly in...
Drone Strike Against U.S. Forces in Tanf, Syria
A coordinated drone and rocket attack, likely from an Iranian-backed militia, struck the U.S. outpost at Tanf in southern Syria on October 20. Groups with ties to Tehran have significantly escalated their attacks on, and use of drones against, U.S. military personnel, partners, and interests in the Middle East this year, probing for weaknesses. In the near-term, the United States must respond forcefully against the perpetrators of the Tanf attack, and the Iranian network supporting them, to deter further attacks. To protect U.S. personnel from further Iranian-backed attacks it is imperative that the Biden administration restore deterrence against Iran which has only be eroded by its limited and inconsistent retaliation for some past att...
Sectarian Violence In Beirut
The deadliest sectarian violence in Lebanon in over a decade erupted as hundreds of armed Hezbollah and Amal Party supporters marched toward the Palace of Justice in Beirut to call for the removal of a judge leading the investigation into the August 2020 port explosion. Sniper fire from rooftops—allegedly by the Christian Lebanese forces—killed at least six people, forcing demonstrators and journalists to take shelter. The willingness of the terrorist group Hezbollah, Iran’s largest proxy, to publicly threaten perhaps the sole remaining functioning Lebanese institution, leaves Lebanon on the brink of either total state failure or complete Hezbollah control. Meanwhile, the sectarian clashes could push Lebanon into a new civil war and H...
Recent Turkish Naval Harassment of Greece and Cyprus
Turkey has resumed its naval harassment of another NATO ally of the United States, Greece, in an attempt to force concessions in a territorial dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean. Continued Turkish bellicosity is likely to continue so long as President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan believes there is no price to pay for it. To encourage a diplomatic solution, and forestall the possibility of escalation, the United States should condemn Turkish actions, work with other NATO partners to apply coordinated political and, if necessary, economic pressure on Turkey to encourage good-faith negotiations, strengthen its deterrent posture in the Eastern Mediterranean, and expand security cooperation with Greece and other partners safely navigating these criti...
Iran’s Looming Centrifuge Breakout
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) recent report on Iran’s nuclear activities shows how, despite attention-grabbing progress in its enrichment of 20 and 60 percent uranium, Iran’s greatest advances toward a nuclear weapons capability in the near-term will likely come from its research and deployment of thousands of new, much more efficient centrifuges. If Iran’s current plans for expanding its enrichment facilities move forward, it could reach the point of being able to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon in well under one month. However, two covert attacks since July 2020 targeting Tehran’s ability to manufacture these machines, appear to have bought valuable time. How much time is unclear because Ir...
Progressives’ Protest Removes Iron Dome Funding
On September 21, progressives in the House of Representatives indicated they would not vote for stopgap legislation preventing a government shutdown later this month because it allocated $1 billion to the Israeli government for its Iron Dome air defense system, which is co-produced with the United States. With only a slim majority in the House, Democratic leadership conceded and removed the funding from the continuing resolution. Because the Iron Dome is a defensive weapons system that saves Israeli and Palestinian lives, Congress must quickly fund President Biden’s promise to replenish the IDF’s supply of Tamir interceptors. RESPONSE: Congress should immediately pass legislation to restore this funding, keeping President Biden’s...
New U.S. Drone Initiative is an Opportunity to Counter Iranian Aggression
The U.S. Navy recently announced an initiative, named Task Force 59, to expand its use of unmanned systems in Middle Eastern waters. The plan coincides with a large escalation of aggression by Iran and its proxies—both at sea and with drones—that has triggered little U.S. military response so far. Task Force 59 intends to provide the United States with expanded capabilities to better address this threat. To best leverage these new unmanned capabilities, the U.S. Navy should expand Task Force 59’s mission to include joint operations with regional partners. Meanwhile, Congress should conduct urgent oversight hearings and briefings to examine Iranian naval aggression and how lessons learned can be applied to the Indo-Pacific Command to c...
Iran Continues Blocking Nuclear Inspectors
On September 12, Iran reached a last-minute deal with international inspectors that does not require it to stop obstructing legally-binding transparency measures on its nuclear program. This one-sided agreement, which potentially paves the way for a resumption of talks on reentering the JCPOA nuclear deal, threatens to undermine the broader nonproliferation regime and leave the outside world in the dark about Iran’s nuclear progress as its breakout window to a bomb becomes dangerously small. These developments only heighten the need for more concerted action by the United States and its allies to uphold the Nonproliferation Treaty and prevent a nuclear Iran. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Mis...
After Biden-Bennett Meeting, Potential Israeli Action Against Chinese Investments
The August 27, 2021 meeting between President Joe Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett provided an important opportunity for the two leaders to discuss the threat posed by China, particularly its investment in Israel. However, reports reveal that their focus on China was surprisingly limited. Following his meeting with Biden, Bennett announced that he would bring under his authority a newly formed committee for reviewing foreign investment into Israel. While a welcome step, more work is needed in this area. Both nations should make it a priority to develop a shared and cooperative approach to the common national security challenges that China poses, including intellectual property theft and acquisition of dual-use technologies,...
Israel Officially Moves to CENTCOM
On September 1, the U.S. Department of Defense officially reorganized Israel within the area of responsibility (AOR) of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) alongside the other Middle Eastern nations. Amid U.S. retrenchment, the move could facilitate enhancement of Israeli capabilities and enhance coordination among American forces in the region, its Arab partners and Israel as they focus on combatting an increasingly aggressive Iran. With the unofficial transition expected to take several more years to complete, the United States must ensure Israel does not lose any capacity in the process, particularly in the realm of joint air and missile defense. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal - Vice Pres...
Iranian Naval Provocations
An Iranian suicide drone attack near Oman against the Israeli-operated MT Mercer Street killed two crewmembers on July 29, marking the most significant escalation in Tehran’s aggression at sea since 2019. The attack is an alarming convergence of two dangerous trends in Iran’s aggressive activities: its maritime harassment and increasing use of drones. This year, Iran and its proxies are increasingly using drones to strike U.S. service members, partners, and interests in Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, with limited U.S. response to date. Now, Tehran is signaling its willingness and ability to apply the lessons it has learned about drones—including its relative impunity—to its maritime aggression. Shortly after the Mercer Stre...
Lebanon Rocket Attacks
On August 6, Hezbollah fired nineteen rockets into Israel, which the Israelis quickly retaliated against with artillery fire into southern Lebanon. The incident is a further escalation of what was already the largest uptick in cross-border fire in years. Left unchecked, there is growing potential for the tense situation along the Israel-Lebanon border to erupt into a deadly multifront war. The Lebanese state is at best failed and at worst coopted by Hezbollah, its misery a direct result of Iranian meddling in the country’s affairs. The United States should not allow the Lebanese state and international community to escape responsibility for restraining Hezbollah and holding the group accountable for destabilizing rocket fire. But Washingt...
Iran’s Provocative 20% Enriched Uranium Claims
European officials recently expressed grave concern about Iran’s July 6 announcement that it would begin using its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium to produce enriched uranium metal. But it is another, earlier, and mostly unremarked on Iranian announcement that should be much more alarming. On June 15, Iran claimed to have 108 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium on hand. This would represent a remarkable advance over the 62.8 kilograms it had just 24 days earlier. If this rate of growth were sustained, Iran would be on course to accumulate enough 20 percent enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, thereby dropping its breakout time to as little as 6 weeks, by mid- to late-July. Producing 20 percent enriched uranium at this r...
Bombings in Iraq Despite Biden Retaliation
Iranian-backed proxies have escalated their attacks on U.S. personnel in Iraq soon after President Biden launched limited airstrikes in response to earlier attacks by these same groups, showing that the administration’s attempts to deter further aggression are not succeeding. Biden’s use of military force against Iranian-linked militias has been too narrow and inconsistent to have the desired effect. Moreover, whatever deterrent value the U.S. reprisals might have is further undermined by administration’s withdrawal of air defense assets necessary to protect against Iranian-linked attacks and negotiations with Tehran over its nuclear program. Instead, the Biden Administration should pursue more forceful retaliation against groups resp...
Iran’s Projectile Threat to U.S. Interests and Partners
For the second time since February, President Biden has ordered airstrikes on Iranian-backed militias after they fired munitions at American servicemembers in Iraq. This action will be insufficient to deter further Iranian aggression throughout the region. Instead, Tehran will perceive the recently announced withdrawal of U.S. air defense assets from the region as a victory, continuing, if not further increasing its attacks, to achieve its goal of driving the United States out of the Middle East. Iranian-fired, -designed, -produced, and/or -supplied projectiles are the greatest current threat to not just to U.S. forces in Iraq but the security of the Middle East more broadly. Comprehensive data assembled by JINSA shows that projectile atta...
Evaluating the Danger from Gaza’s Weapons Stockpile
The fighting between Israel and Gaza that took place from May 10-21, known in Israel as Operation Guardian of the Walls (OGW), proved that Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) maintain a large, diverse, and growing arsenal of projectiles of increasing range that can be fired in coordinated salvos intended to overwhelm Israel’s robust air defenses. These advancements in Palestinian rocket technology threaten Israel’s ability to deter future conflicts and defend against attacks when they occur; they are also a harbinger of the much more devastating potential conflict with Hezbollah on Israel’s northern front. Israel’s ability to deter and defend itself against these growing rocket arsenals, while abiding by the law of armed co...
Assessing Operation Guardians of the Wall
As Israel and Hamas announce a ceasefire last week, IDF MGs (ret.) Yaacov Ayish and Yaakov Amidror discuss the success of Operation Guardians of the Wall, what can be gathered from the latest clash, and the effects of the operation on future deterrence strategy. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Erielle Davidson Senior Policy Analyst
Unprecedented Rocket Fire from Gaza: Ongoing Escalations and Recommendations for the Biden Administration
Taking advantage of violence in Jerusalem precipitated by efforts to evict Palestinians from the Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood, Palestinian terrorists in Gaza have once again fired rockets into Israel. Israel and Hamas have been fierce adversaries in recent years, frequently trading rocket fire, but have avoided fighting a major war since 2014. The Biden administration should work diligently to avoid further escalation between Gazan terrorists and Israel hastening actions that indicate U.S. support for Israel—like appointing an ambassador—and fully backing Israel’s right to self-defense. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Ari Cicurel Senior Policy Analyst Erielle Davidson Senior Policy Analyst
Iran’s Newest Nuclear Steps Won’t Make Up for Delays Caused by Explosion
Iran has attempted to make up for an April 11 explosion at its Natanz enrichment facility by announcing new nuclear advances: enriching uranium to 60 percent and installing an additional 1,000 advanced centrifuges. Though these moves are designed to regain leverage and convince the United States to grant Iran sanctions relief, neither of these announcements will, for now, materially accelerate Iran’s ability to sprint for a nuclear weapon. Instead, the explosion at Natanz appears to have set back Iran’s “breakout” clock — the amount of time needed to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for a single nuclear weapon — by roughly two months. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vice Presi...
Explosion at Iranian Nuclear Plant Buys U.S. Time and Leverage
On April 11, what appears to be an explosion at Iran’s main Natanz nuclear facility, widely suspected to be the result of Israeli sabotage, set back recent advances in Tehran’s ability to enrich uranium quickly and on a large scale – and with it, to pressure Washington to return to the JCPOA. The Biden Administration should embrace the additional leverage and time bought by this action to pursue a more effective strategy for preventing a nuclear Iran, including by publicly endorsing Israel’s freedom of action and working with it to develop further credible military options against Tehran’s nuclear aggression. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vice President for Policy Jonathan Ruhe ...
Biden’s Middle East Drawdown
The Biden Administration is reportedly in the process of redeploying military assets from the Middle East. This is part of a broader effort to rebalance America’s global force posture, which is seen as requiring reduced U.S. presence in the region. However, this move sends the wrong signal as the United States begins nuclear negotiations with Iran as it will leave U.S. interests and Arab partners exposed to, and therefore will likely provoke, growing aggression from Iran and its proxies. Washington must work closely with its regional partners to expand defensive and offensive capabilities for protecting against and deterring Iran and its proxies. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Charles Perkins Director fo...
Iran-Backed Missile and Drone Strikes
Earlier this week, Iran’s Houthi proxies in Yemen escalated their ongoing missile and drone offensive against Saudi Arabia by targeting one of the world’s major oil export terminals. This is part of a larger Iranian strategy to exert regional dominance by developing, proliferating and using these increasingly capable precision munitions to target and exploit its adversaries’ lack of strategic depth in the Middle East. This could eventually give Iran the ability to conduct highly costly, even catastrophic, conventional military strikes in the region. As Tehran relies more and more on these tools and tactics to pressure its neighbors, including American forces, Washington and its partners must proactively deter and degrade Iran’s use ...
Iranian Aggression Despite U.S. Retaliation
Aggression by Iran and its regional proxies continues to escalate along multiple lines of effort with a March 3, 2021 attack on U.S. forces at Al Asad Air Base in Iraq and several alleged attacks against Israel and Saudi Arabia. The Biden Administration’s efforts to engage Tehran diplomatically while deterring it through a discrete, unilateral, and pin-prick military response in Syria on February 25 has not succeeded. Iran will likely continue its comprehensive regional counterpressure strategy of nuclear and military escalation so long as it believes it will be effective in achieving U.S. economic and geopolitical concessions. To establish deterrence, Washington should work with its regional partners to hold Iran accountable for its cont...
U.S. Retaliation in Syria
On February 25, 2021, President Biden ordered an airstrike, his first known use of military force, against buildings tied to Iranian-backed proxies in Syria in retaliation for recent attacks on American personnel in Iraq. This was a welcome response but likely insufficient to deter future Iranian aggression. Indeed, given reports of an explosion on an Israeli-owned ship in the Gulf of Oman just hours later, apparently linked to Iran, it remains to be seen if the United States, or Israel, intends to respond. As the U.S. pursues new nuclear talks with Iran, much in the region, and in U.S.-Iran relations, remains fluid. This policy memo from JINSA staff provides details and context of the airstrike in Syria, background on Iranian-backed ag...
Without U.S. Response, Rocket Attacks Continue
Following a U.S. statement promising “support for all efforts to investigate and hold accountable those responsible” for a February 15, 2021 rocket attack on a U.S. base in Erbil, Iranian proxies have twice more struck at the U.S. targets in Iraq. Most recently, three rockets struck near the U.S. Embassy in Iraq on February 22, 2021. Such attacks by Iranian proxies are likely to become more frequent and dangerous in the absence of a strong U.S. response. This policy memo from JINSA staff provides details of the recent rocket attacks in Iraq, background on Iranian-backed aggression against Americans in Iraq, and policy recommendations for U.S. officials. Click here to read the NatSec Brief. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vic...
Implications of Rocket Attack in Erbil
A rocket attack in Erbil, Iraq on February 15 killed a civilian contractor and left another nine injured. While attacks by Iranian-backed groups on Americans have become common, it is the first such test that the Biden administration faces as they pursue nuclear negotiations with Tehran. This policy memo from JINSA staff provides details of the recent rocket attack in Erbil, background on aggression against American positions in Iraq, and policy recommendations for U.S. officials. Click here to read the memo. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vice President for Policy Ari Cicurel Senior Policy Analyst
Israel’s Acceleration of U.S. Weapons Procurement: Analysis and Recommendations
The Israeli government’s recent approval to purchase U.S.-made aircraft and munitions was enabled in part by providing for earlier use, or “frontloading,” of American defense assistance funds. Building on previous JINSA recommendations, this policy memo provides background for how frontloading supports Israel’s qualitative military edge – and U.S. national security interests in the Middle East – by accelerating Israeli procurement of vital weaponry to counter growing shared threats from Iran and others, without raising the overall cost to the United States. Click here to read the memo. JINSA Staff Contributors Jonathan Ruhe Director of Foreign Policy Charles B. Perkins Director for U.S.-Israel Security Policy Ari Cicurel ...
Implications of Iran’s Enrichment to 20 Percent
Iran’s announcement that it has begun enriching uranium to 20 percent represents its gravest nuclear escalation in years and a shift in its counterpressure strategy against the United States. This policy memo from JINSA staff lays out the implications of Iran’s move and provides policy recommendations for U.S. officials. Click here to read the memo. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vice President for Policy Jonathan Ruhe Director of Foreign Policy
Possible Attack From Iran: Analysis & U.S. Policy Implications
As the anniversary of the U.S. strike that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020 nears, the U.S. military is reportedly preparing for Iranian reprisals. Although important, strategic signaling, such as by flying B-52 bombers over the region, is not adequate to stopping more likely lower-level Iranian attacks, especially since the U.S. is drawing down its regional forces at the same time. To deter and defend against Iranian aggression, both the Trump and Biden teams will have to communicate resolve to defend U.S. personnel and partners, alike. This policy memo from JINSA staff provides background on U.S.-Iran tensions in 2020, possible Iranian motivations if the regime decides to strike, and policy recommendations for U.S. off...
Turkey’s Offensive in Ayn Issa, Syria: Analysis & U.S. Policy Implications
On December 18, 2020, Turkish forces and proxies began attacking the Syrian city of Ayn Issa, currently held by the Syrian Democratic Forces. Although Ankara has not released any public statement about the nature or intent of their operations, this could mark the beginning of a coordinated offensive to retake other SDF-held towns, such as Manbij or Kobane. This policy memo from JINSA staff provides background, ongoing developments, analysis of possible Turkish objectives, and implications for U.S. policy. Click here to read the memo. JINSA Staff Contributors Blaise Misztal Vice President for Policy Jonathan Ruhe Director of Foreign Policy Ari Cicurel Senior Policy Analyst Erielle Davidson Senior Policy Analyst Shiri...
1 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 1 | 9999 | 9999 | Makovsky, PhD |
Michael Makovsky, PhDPresident and Chief Executive Officer |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 4 | 9999 | 9999 | Ruhe |
Jonathan RuheDirector of Foreign Policy |
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John HannahRandi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow; Former Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Vice President |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Millner |
Samuel B. MillnerPolicy Analyst, Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy |
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Andrew GhaliliSenior Policy Analyst, Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 2 | 9999 | 9999 | Misztal |
Blaise MisztalVice President for Policy |
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Ari CicurelSenior Policy Analyst, Gemunder Center for Defense and Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Bird, USN (ret.) |
VADM John M. Bird, USN (ret.)Former Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet |
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Gen James T Conway, USMC (ret.)34th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Stutzriem, USAF (ret.) |
Maj Gen Larry "Stutz" Stutzriem, USAF (ret.)Former Director, Plans, Policy and Strategy at North American Aerospace Defense Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Donald, USN (ret.) |
ADM Kirkland H. Donald, USN (ret.)Former Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program |
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LtGen Kenneth J. Glueck, USMC (ret.)Former Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Combat Development Command |
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ADM Bill Gortney, USN (ret.)Former Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Chilton, USAF (ret.) |
Gen Kevin P. Chilton, USAF (ret.)Former Commander, U.S. Strategic Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Natonski, USMC (ret.) |
LtGen Richard Natonski, USMC (ret.)Former Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Hostage, USAF (ret.) |
Gen Michael Hostage, USAF (ret.)Former Commander, Air Combat Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Cornell |
Svante E. CornellPolicy Advisor, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Corn, USA (ret.) |
LTC Geoffrey S. Corn, USA (ret.)Hybrid Warfare Policy Project Member, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy; Gary A. Kuiper Distinguished Professor of National Security Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Goldstein |
Larry GoldsteinFounder and Director of Energy Policy Research Institute, Inc.; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 3 | 9999 | 9999 | Hannah |
John HannahRandi & Charles Wax Senior Fellow; Former Assistant for National Security Affairs to the Vice President |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Rademaker |
Hon. Stephen RademakerFormer Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Deptula, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (ret.)Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force Headquarters; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Wald, USAF (ret.) |
Gen Charles "Chuck" Wald, USAF (ret.)Distinguished Fellow; Senior Advisor; Co-chair, Iran Policy Project, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project; Member, Gaza Policy Project, U.S.-Israel Security Policy Project |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gerber |
Sander GerberDistinguished Fellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Amidror |
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov AmidrorDistinguished Fellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Noronha |
Gabriel NoronhaDistinguished Fellow, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Abrams |
Elliot AbramsSenior Fellow for Middle East Studies at Council on Foreign Relations |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Strick |
IDF MG Yoel StrickGemunder Center Visiting Military Fellow |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Palumbo, USA (ret.) |
LTG Raymond Palumbo, USA (ret.)Former Deputy Commander of U.S. Army Special Operations |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Lanza, USA (ret.) |
LTG Stephen Lanza, USA (ret.)Former Commanding General of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis McChord |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Davis, USMC (ret.) |
Lt Gen Jon Davis, USMC (ret.)Former Deputy Commandant for Aviation |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gibson, USA (ret.) |
LTG Karen Gibson, USA (ret.)Former Deputy Director for National Intelligence and National Security Partnerships |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Ashley, USA (ret.) |
LTG Robert Ashley, USA (ret.)Former Director, Defense Intelligence Agency |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Azab |
Stephan K. AzabU.S. Air Force Legislative Fellow, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Dermer |
Amb. Ron DermerNon-Resident Distinguished Fellow, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Matthews |
Earl G. MatthewsNon-Resident Fellow, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Perkins |
Charles B. PerkinsFellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Greenert, USN (ret.) |
ADM Jonathan W. Greenert, USN (ret.)Former Chief, Naval Operations (CNO, 2011-2015) |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Ganyard, USMC (ret.) |
Col Stephen T. Ganyard, USMC (ret.)Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Watts, USA (ret.) |
LTC (Prof) Sean M. Watts, USA (ret.)Former Professor of International Law at the Judge Advocate General’s School |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Fiel, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Gen Eric E. Fiel, USAF (ret.)Former Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla. |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Newcomb, USN (ret.) |
CDR Mark E. Newcomb, USN (ret.)Former Principal Legal Advisor to Commander, Battle Force 7th Fleet. |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | VanLandingham, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Col Rachel E. VanLandingham, USAF (ret.)Former Judge Advocate in the U.S. Air Force; Professor of Law at Southwestern Law School (Los Angeles, CA) |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Clingan, USN (ret.) |
ADM Bruce Clingan, USN (ret.)Former Commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Naval Forces Africa |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Jeffery |
Reuben JefferyFormer Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Fox, USN (ret.) |
VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.)Former Deputy Commander, U.S. Central Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Warren, USA (ret.) |
COL. Marc Warren, USA (ret.)Former senior legal officer in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corp for Multi-National Forces Iraq |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Corey, USA (ret.) |
COL Ian G. Corey, USA (ret.)Former General Counsel for U.S. Army Cyber Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Tucker, USA (ret.) |
LTG Michael S. Tucker, USA (ret.)Former Commanding General of the First United States Army from 2013 until 2016 |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Spoehr, USA (ret.) |
LTG Thomas W. Spoehr, USA (ret.)Former Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Forces – Iraq |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Katsman |
Abraham KatsmanFellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Breedlove, USAF (ret.) |
Gen Philip M. Breedlove, USAF (ret.)Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe; Former Commander U.S. European Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Rodriguez, USA (ret.) |
GEN. David Rodriguez, USA (ret.)Former Commander, United States Africa Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Toolan, Jr., USMC (ret.) |
LtGen John "Jocko" Toolan, Jr., USMC (ret.)Former Commander, Marine Forces Pacific |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Makovsky |
Alan MakovskyFormer Senior Professional Staff Member at U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gardner, USA (ret.) |
LTG John Gardner, USA (ret.)Former Deputy Commander of U.S. European Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Wagner Jr. |
Dr. Richard Wagner Jr.Former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Tegnelia |
Dr. James "Jim" TegneliaFormer Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Stoudt |
Dr. David StoudtDistinguished Engineer, Naval Surface Warfare Center |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Schneider, Jr. |
Dr. William Schneider, Jr.Former Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Popik |
Thomas PopikPresident, Foundation for Resilient Societies |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Pfaltzgraff, Jr. |
Dr. Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr.Professor of International Security Studies, Fletcher School at Tufts University |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Payne |
Dr. Keith PayneFormer Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Nanos, USN (ret.) |
VADM G. Peter Nanos, USN (ret.)Former Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Murray |
Richard MurrayHead of Liability Regimes Project, Geneva Association |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Lehman, II |
Amb. Ronald Lehman, IIFormer Director, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Kappenman |
John KappenmanPresident and CEO, Storm Analysis Consultants |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Foster Jr. |
Dr. John Foster Jr.Former Director, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Member, Congressional EMP Commission |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Baker |
Dr. George BakerFormer Electromagnetics Group Leader, Defense Nuclear Agency |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Joseph |
Amb. Robert JosephCo-Chair, EMP Task Force; Former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gabbard |
Dr. Bryan GabbardCo-Chair, EMP Task Force; Executive Vice President, Defense Group Inc. |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Jones, USA (ret.) |
MG. Mike Jones, USA (ret.)Former Chief of Staff, U.S. Central Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Devereaux, USAF (ret.) |
Maj Gen Rick Devereaux, USAF (ret.)Former Director of Operational Planning, Policy, and Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Caldwell, IV, USA (ret.) |
LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, USA (ret.)Former Commander, U.S. Army North |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Zakheim |
Roger ZakheimFormer General Counsel and Deputy Staff Director of U.S. House Armed Services Committee |
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Dr. Ray TakeyhHasib J. Sabbagh Senior Fellow for Middle East Studies at Council on Foreign Relations |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Obering, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Gen Henry Obering, USAF (ret.)Former Director of the Missile Defense Agency |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Edelman |
Amb. Eric EdelmanCounselor; Co-Chair Iran Policy Project and Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Trask, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Gen Thomas "Tom" Trask, USAF (ret.)Former Vice Commander, United States Special Operations Command |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Stavridis, USN (ret.) |
ADM James Stavridis, USN (ret.)Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander and former Commander of U.S. European Command; Chairman, Gemunder Center U.S.-Israel Security Task Force |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Corn, USA (ret.) |
LTC Geoffrey S. Corn, USA (ret.)Hybrid Warfare Policy Project Member, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy; Gary A. Kuiper Distinguished Professor of National Security Law, South Texas College of Law, Houston |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Wald, USAF (ret.) |
Gen Charles "Chuck" Wald, USAF (ret.)Distinguished Fellow; Senior Advisor; Co-chair, Iran Policy Project, Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project; Member, Gaza Policy Project, U.S.-Israel Security Policy Project |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Gerber |
Sander GerberDistinguished Fellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Amidror |
IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov AmidrorDistinguished Fellow, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Noronha |
Gabriel NoronhaDistinguished Fellow, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Dermer |
Amb. Ron DermerNon-Resident Distinguished Fellow, JINSA's Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Edelman |
Amb. Eric EdelmanCounselor; Co-Chair Iran Policy Project and Eastern Mediterranean Policy Project; Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Cornell |
Svante E. CornellPolicy Advisor, Gemunder Center for Defense & Strategy |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Goldstein |
Larry GoldsteinFounder and Director of Energy Policy Research Institute, Inc.; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Rademaker |
Hon. Stephen RademakerFormer Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | 9999 | Deptula, USAF (ret.) |
Lt Gen David Deptula, USAF (ret.)Former Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force Headquarters; JINSA Gemunder Center Senior Advisor |
Benjamin Gettler Annual International Policy Trip
The Benjamin Gettler International Policy Trip annually brings high-level delegations of retired senior military officers and civilian national security experts to a country that is important to U.S. national security and/or the U.S.-Israel relationship. After completing their trip, each group shares their findings and recommendations with policymakers and opinion leaders in Washington, D.C. and across the United States. This important program is made possible by the generous support from the Gettler Family Foundation, in memory of former JINSA Chairman Benjamin Gettler.
- 2019
- 2018
- 2021
Greece
The Benjamin Gettler Annual International Policy Trip visited Greece from November 13-16, 2021. The delegation was led by JINSA President & CEO Dr. Michael Makovsky and consisted of: Gen (ret.) Philip Breedlove, USAF – Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Commander US European Command Gen (ret.) Charles Wald, USAF, former Deputy Commander of United States European Command (EUCOM) Gen (ret.) Thomas Waldhauser, USMC — Commander, U.S. Africa Command Alan Makovsky Meetings included: Minister of Hellenic National Defense Mr. Nikolaos Panagiotopoulos Minister of Environment and Energy Mr. Costas Skrekas Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, General Konstantinos Floros Chief of the Hellenic Air Fo...

Greece
The Benjamin Gettler Annual International Policy Trip visited Greece from March 31-April 4. The delegation was led by JINSA President & CEO Dr. Michael Makovsky and consisted of: Gen Charles Wald, USAF (ret.) Gen Kevin Chilton, USAF (ret.) VADM Mark Fox, USN (ret.) Lt Gen Thomas Trask, USAF (ret.) IDF MG (ret.) Yaakov Ayish Dr. Svante Cornell Alan Makovsky Meetings included: Chief of the Hellenic National Defense Staff, Christos Christodoulou Defense Minister, Admiral Evangelos Apostolakis Shadow Defense Minister, Mr. Vassilis Kikilias Minister of Environment and Energy, Giorgos Stathakis Rear Admiral Dimitrios Kavoulakos Opposition Member, Giorgos Koumoutsakos Leading Greek Think Tank, E...

Egypt
April 29 - May 4, 2018 Participants included: ADM Bruce Clingan, USN (ret.) Gen Charles Wald, USAF (ret.) LTG Howard Bromberg, USA (ret.) LtGen Kenneth Glueck, USMC (ret.) Meetings included: President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi Head of the General Intelligence Service (GIS) Foreign Minister Sameh Hassan Shoukry Minister of Defense Sedki Sobhy Commentary: The U.S. is Right to Restore Aid to Egypt Reuters - July 30, 2018 by ADM Bruce Clingan, USN (ret.) and Read More
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